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Article 
DISABILITY AND DESIGNER BABIES 
Brigham A. Fordham* 
If deaf parents purposely use new genetic technologies to 
give their child the genes for deafness, have the parents 
harmed the child?  This and similar questions regarding 
parents who make genetic choices in favor of disability have 
preoccupied much of the scholarship regarding new artificial 
reproductive technologies.  Some have argued that we should 
determine whether a child has been harmed by pondering 
whether the child’s “right to an open future” has been violated 
by the parents’ genetic intervention.  If that right is violated, 
some say, the parents should be subject to tort liability for 
inflicting a harm upon the child. 
This Article considers the consequences of attempting to 
hold parents liable in tort for making genetic decisions in favor 
of socially disfavored physical attributes, such as disabilities.  
A legal scheme that asks judges and juries to separate “good” 
physical attributes from “bad” ones is problematic, especially 
when dealing with disabilities.  Parents who have personal 
experience with the physical traits in question are better 
equipped to decide what is best for their offspring than jurors 
who have less experience and less at stake.  Using the “open 
future” framework to second-guess parental decisions about 
socially disfavored physical traits only disrupts the parent-
child relationship and suggests that discriminatory attitudes 
are natural and acceptable. 
Moreover, the concern over genetic interventions in favor 
of disability is largely misplaced.  Disabled parents who want 
disabled children are few in number and diverse in purpose.  
The recent focus on these parents in the debate over genetic 
intervention improperly assumes that such parents are 
incapable of making good choices and that the physical traits 
they prefer are inherently damning. 
                                                 
* Associate Professor of Law, Phoenix School of Law; J.D., University of California at 
Berkeley; B.A., University of Utah.  This Article is dedicated to the memory of my friend 
and mentor, Paul K. Longmore, 1945−2010. 
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All that is not given is lost.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Two years ago, a fertility clinic in New York made headlines by 
claiming to offer parents the opportunity to choose the eye color, race, 
and hair color of their future children.2  The clinic said it could use 
genetic testing known as preimplantation genetic diagnosis (“PGD”) to 
determine which embryos have genetic markers of the parents’ preferred 
attributes.3  The embryos with the preferred genetic markers would then 
be implanted.4  Some responded with delight to the clinic’s promise to 
create so-called “designer babies,” while others condemned the practice.5 
There is some doubt whether current technology gives physicians 
the ability to do what this clinic advertised—i.e., specifically test for the 
genetic markers for attributes like eye color and race in embryos prior to 
implantation.6  There is little doubt, however, that such technology will 
soon be available.7  Moreover, some predict that before long, scientists 
will be able not only to test embryos for specific genetic attributes, but 
also they will actually be able to change the genetic structure of the 
embryo to match the attributes preferred by the parents.8  The prospect 
of genetic manipulation of embryos, often called “genetic intervention,” 
raises a number of questions about identity, diversity, and the proper 
                                                 
1 Indian proverb.  See Rumer Godden, Luck That Seems Like Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 
1985 (reviewing DOMINIQUE LAPIERRE, THE CITY OF JOY (Kathryn Spink trans., 1985)). 
2 Gautam Naik, A Baby, Please. Blond, Freckles—Hold the Colic, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2009, 
at A10; Hattie Kauffman, “Designer Babies” Ethical?, CBS NEWS:  THE EARLY SHOW (Mar. 3, 
2009, 7:24 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/03/03/earlyshow/health/main 
4840346.shtml; Gina Salamone, Custom-Made Babies Delivered:  Fertility Clinic Doctor’s 
Design-A-Kid Offer Creates Uproar, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.nydaily 
news.com/news/2009/03/02/2009-03-02_custommade_babies_delivered_fertility_cl.html 
#ixzz0dHZmEE4M. 
3 See services cited supra note 2 (explaining that reproductive technologies are allowing 
parents to choose the attributes of their children). 
4 See services cited supra note 2 (noting that lab-created embryos with the preferred 
traits are used). 
5 Salamone, supra note 2; see also Kauffman, supra note 2.  The owner of the clinic 
responded to critics as follows:  “Genetic health is the wave of the future . . . . It’s already 
happening and it’s not going to go away.  It’s going to expand.  So if they’ve got major 
problems with it, they need to sit down and really examine their own consciences because 
there’s nothing that’s going to stop it.”  Salamone, supra note 2. 
6 See services cited supra note 2 (noting that some doctors question the ability to give 
parents their pick of traits). 
7 See services cited supra note 2 (suggesting that technology will likely be available in a 
couple years). 
8 DENA S. DAVIS, GENETIC DILEMMAS 35 (2d ed. 2010); Nancy Pham, Choice v. Chance:  
The Constitutional Case for Regulating Human Germline Genetic Modification, 34 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 133, 134 & n.10 (2006) (citing advancing research). 
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role of technology in conception.  Should genetic intervention be 
permitted?  If so, should there be limits on which genetic traits may be 
chosen?  And if we do impose limits, who is best qualified to decide and 
enforce those limits? 
Presumably, parents who attempt genetic intervention would do so 
in the hope of benefitting their child.  Recently, however, a number of 
commentators have expressed concern that—despite good intentions—
some parents may use genetic intervention to impose upon their 
offspring attributes that are actually harmful to the child.9  Two examples 
of purportedly harmful genetic interventions are repeated in the 
literature, both of which center around parents with disabilities who 
want to have a child that shares their same disability.  First, deaf parents 
might use genetic intervention to have a deaf child.10  Second, parents of 
short stature11 might use genetic intervention to have a child with 
achondroplasia.12  Worried that deafness and short stature might be 
harmful to children, some commentators have called for legal remedies 
to prevent parents from using genetic intervention to produce a child 
with physical attributes commonly associated with disability.13 
Thus, the debate over parental liability for genetic decisions seems to 
call for determinations about the consequences of particular disabilities14 
and, impliedly, the competence of disabled parents to make beneficial 
                                                 
9 DAVIS, supra note 8, at 61–90; Owen D. Jones, Reproductive Autonomy and Evolutionary 
Biology:  A Regulatory Framework for Trait-Selection Technologies, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 187, 220–
21 (1993); Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Creating Children with Disabilities:  Parental Tort Liability 
for Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 299–301 (2008) [hereinafter 
Smolensky, Genetic Interventions]. 
10 I have attempted to follow the convention of capitalizing the word “deaf” when 
referring to the culture and community and not capitalizing the word when referring to the 
physical condition.  See Edward Dolnick, Deafness as Culture, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 
1993, at 38.  In many cases, it is difficult to distinguish the cultural aspects of deafness from 
the physical aspects because they overlap. 
11 I use the terms “persons of short statute” and “persons with dwarfism” as 
interchange.  I also make reference to persons with achondroplasia, which is the most 
common genetic condition causing dwarfism.  See Frequently Asked Questions, LITTLE 
PEOPLE AM., http://www.lpaonline.org/mc/page.do?sitePageId=84634&orgId=lpa (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2011) (providing answers to numerous questions relevant to dwarfism). 
12 DAVIS, supra note 8, at 61–90; Jones, supra note 9, at 223; Smolensky, Genetic 
Interventions, supra note 9, at 300, 308. 
13 Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 299. 
14 I use the term “disability” in this Article to refer to physical traits that are generally 
associated with disability.  Such physical traits might physically limit a person, or the 
limitations might derive, in whole or in part, from environmental factors, such as physical 
barriers and social attitudes.  This definition purposely treats disability as vague and 
protean—because so too are the attitudes and environmental factors that can make a 
physical trait disabling.  To emphasize this point, I use “disability” interchangeably with  
“socially disfavored physical traits.” 
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genetic decisions for their children.15  In a recent symposium,16 Professor 
Kirsten Rabe Smolensky argued that parents who choose genetic 
intervention in order to have a child who has a disability should be 
subject to tort liability if the parents’ genetic choice is later found to have 
violated the child’s “right to an open future.”17  Not wanting to prohibit 
all genetic interventions but rather only those that are harmful to 
children, Smolensky would leave it to judges and juries to decide when a 
parent’s genetic intervention in favor of disability is sufficiently harmful 
to warrant liability.18 
This Article considers the consequences of attempting to hold 
parents liable in tort for making genetic decisions in favor of socially 
disfavored physical attributes, such as disabilities.  A legal scheme that 
asks judges and juries to separate “good” physical attributes from “bad” 
ones is problematic, especially when the physical attributes in question 
are commonly viewed as disabilities.  When judges and juries are forced 
to speculate about the future consequences of physical conditions that 
most of them have never experienced, they are likely to rely upon long-
established social stereotypes that disability is inherently tragic.  This can 
lead to wrong results and, equally disturbing, reinforcement of negative 
views about disability and the competence of parents with disabilities. 
But there is also a more subtle problem with the debate over genetic 
intervention when it comes to disability.  Commentators tend to use 
terms such as “diminishment,” “untherapeutic,” and “defect” without 
explaining how a decision maker like a judge or jury could realistically 
and objectively determine which physical attributes fall into these 
categories.  The result of this ambiguity is that the debate forever hangs 
in the air, awaiting the moment when a decision maker will tell us what 
kinds of genetic interventions are harmful and which ones are neutral or 
beneficial.  No one points to a particular disability as being uniformly 
harmful.  Yet the debate continues to rely on the assumption that there 
remains some terrible, albeit unidentified, threat of parents harming 
children by favoring attributes associated with disability.  Indeed, given 
how few parents with disabilities actively seek to have children who 
share their disability, this threat, if there is any, is hardly worthy of 
alarm.  Deconstructing the role of disability in this debate provides 
insights into the unspoken cultural and moral assumptions embedded in 
                                                 
15 Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 317, 330. 
16 See id. at 299.  This Article primarily responds to the arguments made in that 
symposium and expands upon the issues that have received less attention. 
17 Id. at 310–12. 
18 Id. at 339–41. 
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arguments about the intersection between genetic intervention, physical 
difference, and parenthood. 
Part II of this Article gives a general background of the current and 
emerging technologies for choosing the genetic makeup of a child, the 
parties who control and influence genetic decisions, and the existing 
legal doctrines that might be evoked if a child sought to hold her parents 
liable in tort for genetic intervention.  Part II.B through Part II.C then 
summarizes Smolensky’s proposal to expand tort liability and identifies 
some of the questions left open by Smolensky and her commentators.  
Part III reexamines the policy reasons that have been suggested in 
support of parental tort liability for genetic interventions.  Although 
there may be good reason to prohibit genetic intervention generally, 
there is no solid basis for prohibiting genetic intervention only when 
parents are seeking to give their child socially disfavored attributes.  
Moreover, it appears that there is no great threat of parents using genetic 
intervention to choose attributes that are ultimately harmful to children.  
Part IV provides a critique of Smolensky’s proposal.  Judges and juries 
are unlikely to be able to properly determine the consequences of genetic 
decisions in favor of disability.  Indeed, holding parents liable for 
negative social views about disability only serves to legitimate those 
views.  The final section offers some thoughts on why disability has been 
a focal point in the debate over genetic intervention, ultimately 
concluding that parents who show an appreciation for genetic diversity 
should not be threatened with tort liability but rather should be given 
the benefit of the doubt. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A. The Technologies and the Gate-Keepers 
There are two general types of artificial reproductive technology at 
issue in this debate—one that currently exists in some forms and one that 
scientists expect to develop in the coming years.  The first technology, 
genetic testing, is widely used to determine the genetic propensities of an 
embryo or fetus.19  Often, parents who are not using in vitro fertilization 
(“IVF”) and who are predisposed to an unwanted genetic trait use 
genetic testing to determine whether to continue a pregnancy.20  Wide 
use of genetic testing has already changed the make-up of society:  
today, fewer children are born with Down syndrome, a result believed to 
                                                 
19 Angela M. Hannemann, A New Routine:  Assisting Patients in Responding to Prenatal 
Diagnosis, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 337, 337–38 (2006); Lois Shepherd, Protecting Parents’ Freedom to 
Have Children With Genetic Differences, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 761, 775–76. 
20 Hannemann, supra note 19, at 337–38; Shepherd, supra note 19, at 775–76. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 4 [2011], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss4/6
2011] Disability and Designer Babies 1479 
be caused by a growing number of parents aborting fetuses that have 
tested positive for the genotypes associated with Down syndrome.21 
Parents who are using IVF to become pregnant may use PGD to help 
them decide which embryos to implant and which ones to discard.22  
Currently, PGD can be used to test for genotypes of a number of genetic 
conditions, including Down syndrome and susceptibility to some 
cancers.23  In the United States, parents are free to screen embryos using 
PGD and select embryos that have the parents’ desired characteristics.24  
Indeed, fertility clinics routinely use PGD to help parents select embryos 
with the parents’ preferred genetic attributes.25 
In the vast majority of cases, parents use genetic testing to avoid 
having a child who has attributes associated with disability.26  As Lois 
Shepherd notes, the practice of genetic testing itself suggests to parents 
that they should take some action based on the results—and usually that 
means not bringing a child with genetic differences to term.27  A number 
of scholars have also shown that doctors and genetic counselors, whom 
parents rely upon to describe the consequences of genetic conditions, 
tend to emphasize the negative effects of genetic differences and thereby 
encourage parents to avoid bringing a child with such characteristics to 
term.28  This general bias among healthcare providers, when combined 
with social pressure to have a “normal” child, makes parents hesitant to 
have a child who has socially disfavored genetic traits.29 
Physicians not only serve as would-be experts on the consequences 
of genetic conditions, they also act as discretionary gatekeepers to 
Assisted Reproductive Technology (“ART”).  Fertility clinics routinely 
screen patients and may refuse fertility services when they believe that 
the parents are unfit or that such services are not in the best interests of 
                                                 
21 Hannemann, supra note 19, at 338–39 (“[C]urrently about 80% of fetuses diagnosed 
with Down Syndrome through prenatal tests are aborted.”). 
22 DAVIS, supra note 8, at 40–41; Pham, supra note 8, at 134 & nn.11–14. 
23 Dov Fox, Silver Spoons and Golden Genes:  Genetic Engineering and the Egalitarian Ethos, 
33 AM. J.L. & MED. 567, 567 n.2 (2007). 
24 In the UK, by contrast, parents are prohibited from implanting an embryo known to 
have genes for “a serious condition,” including genetic deafness.  DAVIS, supra note 8, at 
86–87. 
25 Susannah Baruch et al., Genetic Testing of Embryos:  Practices and Perspectives of U.S. In 
Vitro Fertilization Clinics, 89 FERTILITY & STERILITY, May 2008, at 1055–57, available at 
http://www.dnapolicy.org/resources/GeneticTestingofEmbryos.pdf. 
26 Shepherd, supra note 19, at 777–79. 
27 Id. 
28 Id.; see also Cara Dunne & Catherine Warren, Lethal Autonomy:  The Malfunction of the 
Informed Consent Mechanism Within the Context of Prenatal Diagnosis of Genetic Variants, 14 
ISSUES L. & MED. 165, 191–93 (1998). 
29 Shepherd, supra note 19, at 777–79. 
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the future child.30  In the United States, “patient screening is conducted 
in a haphazard manner, based on criteria fashioned by individual 
providers that may or may not conform to the voluntary codes of 
professional organizations.”31  A number of ART physicians have stated 
openly that they would refuse to use PGD to help parents select a child 
with genetic deafness or achondroplasia.32  Parents seeking to use PGD 
to select for an embryo with the genotypes for attributes associated with 
disability are likely to find that they must forum-shop to find a fertility 
clinic that will work with them. 
Despite these barriers to using PGD to select an embryo with socially 
disfavored physical traits, there is a small number of reported cases of 
parents using PGD to ensure that their child has traits associated with 
disability.  In 1995, one couple used PGD to select for a child with 
achondroplasia.33  In a 2006 survey of 186 fertility clinics, three percent of 
clinics reported that they had used PGD to help parents select an embryo 
that had attributes associated with disability.34  The survey, however, did 
not define “disability,”35 and some have questioned whether the 
reported results are accurate.36  In any case, there appears to be an 
interest among a small group of parents in having children with physical 
features associated with disability, in particular, features associated with 
short stature and genetic deafness.37 
                                                 
30 Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Disabling Dreams of Parenthood:  The Fertility Industry, Anti-
Discrimination, and Parents With Disabilities, 27 LAW. & INEQ. 311, 311–12 (2009). 
31 Id. at 319. 
32 Lindsey Tanner, Some Ponder “Designer” Babies With Mom or Dad’s Defective Genes, USA 
TODAY (Dec. 21, 2006, 3:09 PM ET), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/ 
genetics/2006-12-21-designer-disability_x.htm; Sarah-Kate Templeton, Deaf Demand Right 
to Designer Deaf Children, SUNDAY TIMES (Dec. 23, 2007), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/ 
tol/news/uk/health/article3087367.ece.  The extent to which physicians may refuse 
treatment based on their personal values, as opposed to based on the welfare of the patient 
or child, is subject to considerable debate.  See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Limits of 
Conscience:  Moral Clashes Over Deeply Divisive Healthcare Issues, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 41, 42−43 
(2008) (discussing the controversy over conscience-based refusals by healthcare 
professionals asked to provide emergency contraceptives). 
33 Faye Flam, Designing the Family Tree a Road to Eugenics?, BUFFALO NEWS, June 25, 1995, 
at F7.  Furthermore, a deaf couple has also utilized artificial insemination to have a deaf 
child by choosing a sperm donor who had a family history of deafness.  Merle Spriggs, 
Lesbian Couple Create a Child Who Is Deaf Like Them, 28 J. MED. ETHICS 283 (2002). 
34 Baruch et al., supra note 25, at 1054. 
35 See Johns Hopkins Univ. Genetics & Pub. Policy Ctr., Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis:  
Practices and Attitudes of Assisted Reproductive Technology Clinics, GENETICS & PUB. POL’Y 
CTR. (April 2006), http://www.dnapolicy.org/resources/PGD_Survey_Questionnaire.pdf. 
36 See Tanner, supra note 32. 
37 See supra notes 25, 32−33 and accompanying text (noting that some parents seek to 
have children with genetic deafness or achondroplasia). 
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The second technology at issue—genetic intervention—is not yet 
available.  Genetic intervention involves manipulating the genetic 
makeup of a fetus or embryo.  Rather than simply testing an embryo for 
genetic traits, genetic intervention would involve changing the DNA of 
the embryo in an effort to produce the parents’ preferred 
characteristics.38  Geneticists predict that genetic intervention is more 
likely to work on gametes or embryos rather than children or adults.39  
Some predict that genetic intervention will, at least in the early stages, 
only be possible using an embryo prior to implantation.40 
Currently in the United States, there are no laws directly addressing 
whether parents may use genetic intervention to have a child with 
particular characteristics.41  Thus, if no regulations are put in place, once 
the technology becomes available, parents will be free to custom-design 
their perfect baby.  That baby might grow up to disagree with her 
parents’ genetic choices.  If a child had her DNA modified through 
genetic intervention while she was still an embryo and later attempted to 
sue her parents for changing her genetic makeup, courts would need to 
cobble together common law and constitutional doctrines to decide 
whether to permit the lawsuit to go forward.  The next section considers 
how courts might apply existing law to determine whether to permit a 
child to bring a tort action against her parents based on the parents’ use 
of genetic intervention. 
 B. Existing Law on Parental Liability for Prenatal Decisions42 
A century ago, in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, Oliver 
Wendell Holmes asserted the general common law rule that a fetus is not 
a separate legal person from its mother.43  For seventy-five years, courts 
                                                 
38 Dov Fox explains the following:  “Genes do not by themselves determine human 
physiology or psychology.  Genes influence a person’s genotype, the instructions for 
development and functioning in human beings.  Genotype often diverges from phenotype, 
a person’s manifested characteristics, as when genetically identical twins exhibit striking 
disparities among a wide range of phenotypic traits.”  Fox, supra note 23, at 568 n.3 
(parenthetical omitted). 
39 Id. at 573–74. 
40 Id. at 567 n.2. 
41 DAVIS, supra note 8, at 86–87.  Outside of the U.S., regulation of PGD varies.  Id. 
42 Genetic intervention would probably not be a “prenatal” decision because it would 
take place prior to implantation.  However, courts would likely look for guidance in tort 
cases involving prenatal injuries.  In addition, courts may look to cases where claims of 
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress were brought based on mishandling 
of embryos.  See, e.g., Ingrid H. Heide, Negligence in the Creation of Healthy Babies:  Negligent 
Infliction of Emotional Distress in Cases of Alternative Reproductive Technology Malpractice 
Without Physical Injury, 9 MICH. ST. J. MED. & LAW 55, 58–59 nn.4–6 (2005). 
43 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884). 
Fordham: Disabilitiy and Designer Babies
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
1482 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
followed the rule laid out in Dietrich, holding that a child could not bring 
a tort action against another for injuries the child suffered in utero.44  
Beginning with Bonbrest v. Kotz in 1946, however, courts began to move 
away from the traditional rule.45  Noting that a developed fetus can 
survive independent of its mother, the Bonbrest court held that a viable 
fetus is indeed a separate legal person who may bring a cause of action 
for prenatal injuries.46  Following Bonbrest, courts in most jurisdictions 
have held that a viable fetus—i.e., one capable of surviving outside the 
womb—is a separate legal person from its mother.47  In addition, some 
jurisdictions permit tort claims to be brought on behalf of non-viable 
fetuses.48 
Still, it is uncertain whether courts would treat an embryo as a 
separate legal entity capable of suffering harms that could form the basis 
of a tort action against a third party.49  Even if courts do give this kind of 
legal status to pre-implantation embryos, it is unclear whether courts 
would permit children to bring tort claims against their parents based on 
genetic intervention that occurred when the child was an embryo.  The 
viability of a claim based on genetic intervention depends greatly on 
how courts categorize genetic intervention.  If genetic intervention is 
treated as a form of negligent prenatal care or as an intentional tort to the 
person, courts in some jurisdictions may permit the child to bring a tort 
action against her parents.  If, however, genetic intervention is treated as 
a medical or reproductive decision, courts are very unlikely to allow 
recovery. 
                                                 
44 Linda C. Fentiman, The New “Fetal Protection”:  The Wrong Answer to the Crisis of 
Inadequate Health Care for Women and Children, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 537, 576 (2006) 
[hereinafter Fentiman, The New Fetal Protection]. 
45 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). 
46 Id. at 140. 
47 Linda C. Fentiman, Pursuing the Perfect Mother:  Why America’s Criminalization of 
Maternal Substance Abuse Is Not the Answer—A Comparative Legal Analysis, 15 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. 389, 412 (2009) [hereinafter Fentiman, Pursuing the Perfect Mother]. 
48 Id. 
49 Professor Ouellette effectively frames the question as follows:  “Can a parent or 
healthcare provider inflict a legally cognizable harm on an embryo before it is implanted, 
when the same parent or provider could dispose of the embryo without penalty?”  Alicia R. 
Ouellette, Insult to Injury:  A Disability-Sensitive Response to Smolensky’s Call for Parental Tort 
Liability for Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 397, 397 (2008) [hereinafter 
Ouellette, Insult to Injury]; see also Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) 
(“[P]reembryos are not, strictly speaking, either ‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but occupy an 
interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human 
life.”). 
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1. Parental Tort Immunity and the Right to Make Medical and 
Reproductive Decisions 
The doctrine of parental tort immunity has had an unsettled life in 
most jurisdictions.50  This doctrine, which gave parents absolute 
immunity from civil actions brought by their minor children, was 
developed in three cases commonly referred to as “the great trilogy.”51  
These foundational decisions gave various justifications for giving 
parents immunity from claims by their children, including the state’s 
interest in preserving family harmony and the need to protect parental 
discretion and authority.52 
Some states adopted the parental immunity doctrine wholesale 
while others adopted parental immunity only in limited situations.53  A 
handful of jurisdictions never adopted the doctrine.54  In 1963, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed its earlier adoption of parental 
immunity and abrogated the doctrine except in limited circumstances.55  
Goller v. White began a “long-overdue landslide” of court decisions 
restricting the scope of parental immunity.56 
Today, parental tort immunity survives only in qualified forms in 
those jurisdictions that have adopted the doctrine.57  Some jurisdictions 
maintain parental immunity except in cases “of abuse or intentional, 
wanton acts” by parents.58  Other jurisdictions have excepted from 
parental immunity injuries resulting from certain acts like driving or 
business activities.59  A third group of jurisdictions follow the approach 
taken by Wisconsin in Goller.  Under the Goller test, parental tort 
immunity is retained only in matters involving ordinary parental 
discretion and authority.  Parental tort immunity may be invoked only in 
the following situations:  “(1) where the alleged negligent act involves an 
exercise of parental authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged 
                                                 
50 Irene Hansen Saba, Parental Immunity from Liability in Tort:  Evolution of a Doctrine in 
Tennessee, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 829, 835–36 (2006). 
51 Id. at 835; Martin J. Rooney & Colleen M. Rooney, Parental Tort Immunity:  Spare the 
Liability, Spoil the Parent, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1991); Benjamin Shmueli, Love and 
the Law, Children Against Mothers and Fathers:  Or, What’s Love Got to Do With It?, 17 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 131 (2010). 
52 Rooney & Rooney, supra note 51, at 1163; Saba, supra note 50, at 837–38. 
53 Saba, supra note 50, at 839–40. 
54 Id. at 836–37; Rooney & Rooney, supra note 51, at 1162 n.12. 
55 Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (Wis. 1963). 
56 Saba, supra note 50, at 843 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON 
TORTS § 122 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS]). 
57 Only two states, Ohio and North Carolina, have abolished parental immunity 
completely without replacing it with some form of parental privilege.  Id. at 848. 
58 Id. at 849 & n.95. 
59 Id. at 849 & nn.96–97. 
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negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with 
respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental 
services, and other care.”60 
In negligence actions brought by children against their parents in 
California, parental tort immunity has been replaced by the “ordinarily 
reasonable and prudent parent” standard.61  A parent’s acts or omissions 
will not result in liability if those acts conform to this standard.62  A 
minority of states have followed California’s approach by adopting the 
ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent standard in place of parental 
immunity.63 
Finally, some courts follow the Restatement’s approach to child-
parent liability.64  The Restatement abolishes parental immunity but 
provides that some activities are privileged because of the parent-child 
relationship.65  The Restatement recognizes a privilege for parental 
discipline and “[t]he intimacies of family life,” and suggests that liability 
is warranted only when the parent’s conduct is “palpably 
unreasonable.”66 
Although courts have developed different tests for assessing the 
limits of parental liability, there is at least some consensus that there is a 
“continued need for parental authority, discipline, and discretion in 
matters uniquely related to the home and family.”67  Indeed, courts 
applying the different tests for parental liability have recognized that, 
except in extreme cases, judges and juries should not second-guess the 
social, cultural, economic, and philosophical factors that shape parental 
                                                 
60 Goller, 122 N.W.2d at 198. 
61 Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 653 (Cal. 1971) (en banc) (emphasis omitted). 
62 Saba, supra note 50, at 849.  It is unclear how, if at all, the reasonable parent standard 
differs from the reasonable person standard.  See Zellmer v. Zellmer, 188 P.3d 497, 503 
(Wash. 2008) (“[I]t should be noted that substituting ‘parent’ for ‘person’ is of little 
consequence, as a judge or jury always is required to consider the status of the actor in 
applying the reasonable person standard in a negligence case.  Thus, the ‘reasonable 
parent’ standard is, in fact, the ordinary negligence standard.”); Rooney & Rooney, supra 
note 51, at 1174 (“[T]he difference between the two standards is purely semantic.  The 
question of what the reasonable and prudent person would do in similar circumstances is 
equivalent to asking what the reasonable and prudent parent would do in similar 
circumstances.  The substitution of the word ‘parent’ for ‘person’ adds nothing new to the 
question.”); Shmueli, supra note 51, at 153 (“This standard . . . label[ed] ‘the California 
approach,’ test[s] whether the parent had acted the way an ‘ordinary and careful’ parent 
would reasonably have acted towards his children in similar circumstances.”). 
63 Zellmer, 188 P.3d at 502 (collecting cases). 
64 Saba, supra note 50, at 850. 
65 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G(2) (1979) (“Repudiation of general tort 
immunity does not establish liability for an act or omission that, because of the parent-child 
relationship, is otherwise privileged or is not tortious.”). 
66 Id. at cmt. k. 
67 Saba, supra note 50, at 854. 
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discretion and authority.68  As one court notes, if there were no privilege 
for parental discretion, “juries would feel free to express their 
disapproval of what they consider to be unusual or inappropriate child 
rearing practices by awarding damages to children whose parents’ 
conduct was only unconventional.”69 
To the extent parental immunity survives, in some respects it runs 
parallel to the constitutional right of parents to exercise discretion in 
raising their children without state interference.70  “[T]he interest of 
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children . . . is perhaps 
the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the 
Supreme] Court.”71  So long as parents are capable of providing for their 
children, the state will not question the parents’ ability to make the best 
choices for their children.72  Thus, “courts are generally unwilling to 
consider the child’s best interests when the desired intervention has the 
support of even one licensed medical provider.”73 
Parental discretion over medical decisions is, however, not 
absolutely protected from state intervention.  The state may intervene 
where “it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or 
safety of [a] child.”74  Thus, parents may not refuse their child life-saving 
treatment.75  Drawing a proper line between parental discretion and 
                                                 
68 See, e.g., Broadbent v. Broadbent, 907 P.2d 43, 49 (Ariz. 1995) (acknowledging the need 
“to protect the right of parents to raise their children by their own methods and in 
accordance with their own attitudes and beliefs”); Paige v. Bing Constr. Co., 233 N.W.2d 46, 
49 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (displaying a court’s reluctance to “enable others, ignorant of a 
case’s peculiar familial distinctions and bereft of any standards, to second-guess a parent’s 
management of family affairs”); Foldi v. Jeffries, 440 A.2d 58, 62 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1981) (“[D]iscretionary judgments involving the adequacy of child care and supervision 
can rarely be separated from the parents’ philosophical dispositions as to how the physical, 
moral, emotional and intellectual growth of their children can best be promoted.”); Zellmer, 
188 P.3d at 503 (“Subjecting parents to liability for negligent supervision inevitably allows 
judges and juries to supplant their own views for the parent’s individual child-rearing 
philosophy.”); see also Rooney & Rooney, supra note 51, at 1169–70 (“A jury’s substitution of 
its decision concerning the exercise of authority or the provision of necessities in place of 
the parents’ decision would be based on only a brief view of the family situation and could 
only be judged against, at best, loosely defined standards.”). 
69 Broadwell v. Holmes, 871 S.W.2d 471, 476 (Tenn. 1994). 
70 Saba, supra note 50, at 879 (“Parental immunity under the Broadwell standard extends 
no further than the constitutional rights of the parent.”). 
71 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). 
72 Id. at 68–69; see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (asserting a “presumption 
that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment 
required for making life’s difficult decisions”). 
73 Alicia Ouellette, Shaping Parental Authority Over Children’s Bodies, 85 IND. L.J. 955, 969 
(2010) [hereinafter Ouellette, Shaping Parental Authority]. 
74 Commonwealth v. Robinson, 910 NE.2d 911, 918 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009) (quoting 
Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (Mass. 1978)). 
75 Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d at 1063. 
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appropriate state intervention is particularly difficult when the child is 
yet a fetus.  Some courts have compelled pregnant women to undergo a 
Caesarean section when the health of the fetus was deemed at risk.76  
And in some states, a pregnant woman who engages in substance abuse 
may be civilly committed to protect the health of the fetus.77  These 
developments in the “fetal protection” movement have been criticized by 
many as impinging upon the mother’s rights to privacy and self-
determination.78 
Related to parents’ discretion in raising their children is the right of 
parents to make reproductive decisions free from unwarranted state 
intrusion.  The Supreme Court has asserted that parents have a 
fundamental right to decide whether to reproduce.79  It is not clear, 
however, how far this procreative liberty extends.80  Some have argued 
that parents’ reproductive rights include the right to make genetic 
decisions about what kind of child to conceive.81 
Courts have not asserted that these constitutional parental rights 
directly limit the scope of private lawsuits between children and parents.  
Courts have, however, recognized that tort law must take into 
consideration parents’ privacy rights and discretionary authority.82  
Thus, the boundaries of private tort law are influenced, if not directly 
constrained, by constitutional limits on interference in family affairs.  
The policies underlying parental decision-making authority, in 
combination with the surviving aspects of parental tort immunity, 
                                                 
76 See Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. 
Fla. 1999); Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding Cnty. Hosp., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981); see also 
Fentiman, The New Fetal Protection, supra note 44, at 568; Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the 
Delivery Room:  The Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesareans, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1951 (1986); cf. In 
re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1252 (D.C. 1990) (holding that a mother’s wish to avoid a Cesarean 
section should be followed in “virtually all” cases). 
77 Fentiman, The New Fetal Protection, supra note 44, at 566–67 & nn.37–38 (collecting 
statutes). 
78 E.g., id. at 564–70. 
79 Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Regulating Reproductive Technologies, 21 J. LEGAL 
MED. 35, 45 (2000). 
80 Id. 
81 See id. (indicating that some commentators believe that the right of procreative liberty 
is broad and most objections to the ARTs do not justify a ban or burden on their use); Fox, 
supra note 23, at 569–70 (summarizing authorities arguing for a right to make genetic 
decisions). 
82 See, e.g., Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 361 (Ill. 1988) (detailing a mother’s 
privacy and autonomy); Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474, 477 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) 
(explaining that not all mothers are the same, as many have differing beliefs and resources); 
see also sources cited supra note 68 (discussing cases favorable to the protection of parents’ 
rights). 
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suggest a policy for giving some deference to the varying social and 
cultural dynamics within families. 
2. Tort Liability of Parents for Prenatal Injuries 
Since Holmes’s pronouncement in Dietrich, courts have struggled to 
determine when a civil action may be brought based on prenatal injuries.  
Today, every state permits a tort action against a third party for prenatal 
injuries if the child is born alive.83  Most states allow a wrongful death 
action on behalf of a viable fetus that dies prior to birth due to prenatal 
injuries.84  A minority of states also permit a wrongful death action on 
behalf of a non-viable fetus.85 
Although there is some agreement that a child may bring a claim for 
prenatal injuries against a third party, it is not clear that the same action 
may be brought against the child’s mother.86  Cases in which the alleged 
tortfeasor is the mother of the plaintiff are considerably rarer—and more 
difficult.  There are only six reported decisions addressing whether a 
child may bring an action for negligence against its mother for prenatal 
injuries suffered by the child.87  Three of these courts permitted such an 
action88 and three refused to recognize the cause of action.89  There 
appears to be no case law addressing whether a child may sue her 
mother for intentionally inflicted prenatal injuries.90 
The courts that have permitted negligence claims against a mother 
for prenatal injuries have focused primarily on the abrogation of the 
doctrine of parental tort immunity.  In Grodin v. Grodin,91 the plaintiff 
alleged that his mother negligently took tetracycline during her 
                                                 
83 Fentiman, Pursuing The Perfect Mother, supra note 47, at 411–12. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Presumably an action for prenatal injuries inflicted by the father would be treated the 
same as injuries inflicted by a third party because fathers do not have the unique symbiotic 
relationship with a fetus that mothers do during pregnancy.  See, e.g., Chenault, 989 S.W.2d 
at 475–76 (refusing to find a duty of a mother to her fetus because of “[t]he unique 
symbiotic relationship between a mother and her unborn child” and noting that “[i]n no 
other relationship is one so completely dependent upon another for life itself”). 
87 See sources cited infra notes 88–89 (listing three cases permitting a cause of action for 
prenatal injuries and three cases denying a cause of action for prenatal injuries). 
88 See Nat’l Cas. Co. v. N. Trust Bank, 807 So. 2d 86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Grodin v. 
Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Bonte v. Bonte, 616 A.2d 464 (N.H. 1992). 
89 See Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988); Remy v. MacDonald, 801 N.E.2d 
260 (Mass. 2004); Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 478. 
90 Clearly, a child can sue her parent for intentional torts inflicted after birth.  To the 
extent courts permit claims based on prenatal negligence, they would most likely also 
permit claims based on intentionally tortious prenatal conduct. 
91 301 N.W.2d 869. 
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pregnancy, causing plaintiff to develop discolored teeth.  The Michigan 
Court of Appeals held that the lawsuit could proceed so that the jury 
could determine whether Mrs. Grodin’s actions fell within one of the 
exceptions to Michigan’s abrogation of prenatal tort immunity.92  If 
taking tetracycline was not a “reasonable exercise of parental discretion,” 
Mrs. Grodin could be held liable for her son’s darkened teeth.93 
Similarly in Bonte v. Bonte, a father brought an action against the 
mother as a next friend of a child who suffered prenatal injuries in a car 
accident.94  He alleged negligence for failing to use reasonable care in 
crossing a street and failing to use the designated crosswalk.95  The 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire permitted the action to go forward.  
Although recognizing “the unique relationship of the pregnant woman 
to her fetus,” the court held that it was not “logical . . . to disallow [a] 
child’s claim against the mother for negligent conduct that caused injury 
to the child months, days, or mere hours before the child's birth.”96  This 
principle was followed in National Casualty Co. v. Northern Trust Bank, 
where the Florida Court of Appeals also held that the abrogation of 
parental immunity allows for a child to bring a claim for prenatal 
negligence against her mother.97 
The courts that have rejected claims for prenatal injury by a child 
against her mother have done so based in part on the problems inherent 
in attempting to develop a fair standard for judging a mother’s prenatal 
decisions.  In Stallman v. Youngquist, the Illinois Supreme Court held that 
a child who suffered prenatal injuries in a car accident could not sue her 
mother for negligently driving.98  The court criticized the Grodin court’s 
failure to recognize the unique relationship between a mother and fetus, 
which is “unlike the relationship between any other plaintiff and 
defendant.”99  Virtually every action of a pregnant mother as well as 
some actions taken prior to conception, the court said, may affect the 
                                                 
92 Id. at 870. 
93 Id.  Michigan law provides an exception to the abrogation of parental immunity where 
“the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental authority over the 
child.”  Id.  The Grodin court read this exception to require a jury determination of whether 
the parent acted “reasonably” in exercising parental authority.  Id. at 871.  This approach, 
however, seems to render the exception meaningless.  If a parent’s act is “reasonable” then 
there is no basis for a claim of negligence in the first place, and thus no need to inquire into 
whether parental immunity applies to the situation.  Id. 
94 616 A.2d 464 (N.H. 1992). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 466. 
97 807 So. 2d 86, 87–88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
98 531 N.E.2d 355, 361 (Ill. 1988). 
99 Id. at 360. 
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health of a fetus.100  The court declined to recognize a duty that would 
make mothers the guarantors of the health of their unborn children:  
“Judicial scrutiny into the day-to-day lives of pregnant women would 
involve an unprecedented intrusion into the privacy and autonomy of 
the citizens of this State.”101 
In Chenault v. Huie, the Texas Court of Appeals followed Stallman 
and refused to permit a cause of action by a child injured by her mother’s 
negligent alcohol and drug abuse during pregnancy.102  The court further 
elaborated on the problems that arise from attempting to define a duty of 
a mother to her unborn child:  “[R]eligious beliefs, social and economic 
status, age, maturity, and educational level differ significantly among 
women.  Each of these factors may affect a woman’s decisions with 
respect to prenatal care.”103  The court refused plaintiff’s proposal that 
the court adopt a modified “reasonable person” standard in assessing 
prenatal conduct:  “The ‘reasonable person’ standard . . . is simply not 
designed to apply to matters involving intimate, private, and personal 
decisions.”104  Because prenatal decisions “involve applying inherently 
subjective values,” jurors would inevitably “apply their own personal 
views to the facts presented resulting in verdicts that would be varied 
and, in all probability, inconsistent and unpredictable.”105  The court 
condemned maternal alcohol and drug use during pregnancy, but 
expressed doubt that tort liability was the appropriate way to discourage 
such conduct.106 
In the most recent case involving a claim against a mother for 
prenatal injuries, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Remy v. 
McDonald held that a child could not bring a claim against her mother for 
prenatal negligence.107  The court criticized the Grodin, Bonte, and 
National Casualty courts for “fail[ing] to address the collateral social and 
other impacts of the imposition of a legal (as opposed to a moral) 
obligation that would hold a pregnant woman to a standard of care 
towards her unborn child.”108  The court thus declined to find a legal 
duty of a mother to her unborn child, noting that permitting such claim 
                                                 
100 Id. at 359. 
101 Id. at 361. 
102 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App. 1999). 
103 Id. at 477. 
104 Id.  For other criticism of the reasonably prudent parent standard, see supra note 62. 
105 Chenault, 989 S.W.2d at 478. 
106 Id. 
107 801 N.E.2d 260, 262 (Mass. 2004). 
108 Id. at 265. 
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“could have profound social implications and far reaching unforeseen 
legal consequences.”109 
3. Where Does Genetic Intervention Fit in? 
The prenatal negligence cases raise some of the same issues that 
would be raised by a case in which a child sued her parents for using 
genetic intervention to give the child particular traits.  Both kinds of 
cases seek to prevent acts that could result in injury to the later-born 
child, and courts would need to find some appropriate objective measure 
by which to judge parental acts.110  This is a difficult task given the 
diversity of viewpoints and circumstances surrounding conception and 
prenatal care. 
Despite these common issues, however, negligence law is an 
uncomfortable fit for claims based on genetic intervention.  Unless 
genetic engineering becomes so common and routine that it occurs by 
default, genetic intervention will most certainly be considered an 
intentional act.  Parents would not fall into genetic intervention through 
carelessness; rather, parents would intentionally engage in genetic 
intervention with specific objectives.  If the decision to engage in genetic 
intervention is irresponsible or foolish, the harm that comes from 
intervention is the result of a bad calculation of what will help the 
child—rather than a failure to take some precaution.111  A parent’s 
decision to use genetic intervention is much more deliberate than, for 
example, a pregnant mother’s failure to anticipate the consequences of 
taking a medication (as in Grodin)112 or a mother’s failure to use the 
designated crosswalk (as in Stallman).113  Mrs. Grodin did not ingest 
tetracycline for the purpose of giving her son discolored teeth any more 
                                                 
109 Id. at 264. 
110 On the other hand, some of the prenatal negligence cases are strongly influenced by 
the unique symbiotic relationship between a mother and her fetus.  See, e.g., Chenault, 989 
S.W.2d at 475–76.  Parents who engage in genetic intervention outside the womb do not 
have such a relationship with an embryo at the time of the intervention.  Arguably, in this 
respect genetic intervention cases are easier to resolve because they do not raise questions 
about the mother’s right to privacy and self-determination.  See Smolensky, Genetic 
Interventions, supra note 9, at 323 (arguing that the rationales that led courts to find no duty 
in prenatal negligence cases do not support the same rule in cases of genetic intervention). 
111 Cf. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (characterizing 
negligence as a failure to take adequate precautions in light of probable risks); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 3 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) 
(stating that a determination of negligence includes considering “the burden that would be 
borne by the person and others if the person takes precautions that eliminate or reduce the 
possibility of harm”). 
112 See Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). 
113 See Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988). 
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than the mother in Stallman crossed the street carelessly in order to harm 
her fetus.  Thus, even courts that do find parents owe a duty to their 
unborn child are unlikely to characterize the intentional act of genetic 
intervention as a form of negligence. 
Battery law supplies a slightly better fit for a claim based on genetic 
intervention.  As an intentional tort, battery corresponds with the 
intentional nature of genetic intervention.  Battery is generally defined as 
an intentional, harmful or offensive contact with the person of another.114  
Smolensky explains that genetic intervention would require multiple 
intentional contacts with the embryo:  “In the preimplantation context, 
there is intent to make contact with the embryo when it is formed in the 
petri dish, when it is manipulated or has cells removed, and when it is 
implanted in the womb.”115  In most jurisdictions, an intentional contact 
is a battery, even if the tortfeasor intended no harm or offense, so long as 
the tortfeasor intended to make contact with another’s “person.”116  
Under this rule, parents who engage in genetic intervention may be 
found to have the necessary intent for battery despite the fact they did 
not intend the intervention to harm or offend the child. 
Determining whether a genetic intervention is “harmful or 
offensive” would require a leap of imagination.  An embryo has no 
physical abilities to lose; it only has certain tendencies and potentials.  
Likewise, an embryo is incapable of being offended or expressing 
consent.  Lacking direct evidence, courts could leave it to juries to 
determine, based on the juror’s experience with the physical attributes 
chosen by the parents, whether the particular genetic intervention was 
harmful or offensive. 
Given that this inquiry requires speculation about future abilities of 
children as well as value-laden decisions about what kinds of things are 
beneficial in life, courts may choose to defer to parental discretion.  In 
some jurisdictions, parents could invoke parental tort immunity by 
claiming that genetic intervention falls within discretionary provision of 
medical services.  Even outside the doctrine of parental immunity, courts 
may defer to parents’ decisions to use genetic intervention based on the 
general rule that a minor is presumed to consent to most medical 
procedures authorized by the parents. 
                                                 
114 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18 (1979). 
115 Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 319. 
116 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13; Kenneth W. Simons, A Restatement (Third) of 
Intentional Torts?, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1061, 1066 (2006).  There may be some arguments that an 
embryo is not a “person” prior to implantation because at that point embryos may legally 
be discarded.  See supra note 49. 
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In order to justify court interference with parental rights, courts 
would need a means for determining when genetic intervention 
constitutes a significant, legally cognizable harm to the child.  The next 
section describes Smolensky’s proposal for expanding tort liability by 
measuring harm by the anticipated future consequences of the genetic 
traits imposed upon the child. 
C. Arguments for Expanding Tort Liability 
1. The “Open Future” Test for Harm 
In her article, Creating Children with Disabilities, Smolensky argues 
that parents “should be liable to their children in tort where they directly 
intervene in the child’s DNA, and consequently cause that child to suffer 
a disability that limits the child’s right to an open future.”117  Citing 
anecdotal evidence that some parents with certain disabilities have 
sought to have children who share the parents’ disability, Smolensky 
concludes that there is a real threat that parents may attempt to use 
intervention to harm their future children.118 
Smolensky starts from the position that parents should be permitted 
to use technological advances in artificial reproductive technologies to 
make procreative decisions except when those decisions are likely to 
cause harm to the later-born child.119  “The key question then becomes,” 
Smolensky asserts, “which modified phenotypes constitute legally 
cognizable harms?”120  In the context of genetic intervention, Smolensky 
argues, harm should be assumed when parents choose to give their child 
a trait that “unreasonably limit[s] the life plans available to their 
child.”121  First, Smolensky appears to advocate a shift in the burden of 
proof when a parent has used genetic intervention to conceive a child 
with a disability.122  Adopting the approach of John Robertson, 
Smolensky argues that 
if parents purposefully produce a child with fewer 
capabilities, or less health, when they could produce a 
more healthful or capable child, there [should be] a 
presumption of harm unless it can be shown by a 
                                                 
117 Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 299. 
118 Id. at 304 (“[D]espite the general expectation that parents will make beneficial genetic 
choices for their future children, this may not always be the case.  In fact, some evidence 
suggests that parental preferences for arguably harmful interventions are real.”). 
119 Id. at 307–08 (adopting the modern traditionalist view of procreative liberty). 
120 Id. at 301. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 308–09. 
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preponderance of the evidence that such children are at 
least as well-off as their more healthful or capable 
alternate selves.123 
Second, Smolensky argues for adoption of the moral rights approach 
of Joel Feinberg to provide a test for harm.124  Under this approach, 
courts would assume a legally cognizable harm has been inflicted if the 
parents’ choice infringes upon the child’s “right to an open future.”125  
Under the open future test, Smolensky believes that “most, if not all, 
traits defined as disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”) should be considered legally cognizable injuries.”126 
Therefore, Smolensky argues in favor of liability under both 
intentional and negligence tort theories.127  She asserts that genetic 
intervention could be treated as a battery because the process of 
intervention involves multiple contacts with the body of the embryo.  
Because genetic intervention is done without the consent of the future 
child, Smolensky argues that courts should use an objective standard to 
determine whether the particular intervention is harmful or offensive.128  
She concludes that 
[u]nder an objective standard of offense the creation of 
genetic traits such as deafness or achondroplasia are 
almost certain to be considered offensive to a reasonable 
sense of personal dignity.  This is illustrated by the fact 
that most people would be offended if they were 
                                                 
123 Id. at 309 (citing JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE:  FREEDOM AND THE NEW 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 22 (1994)). 
124 Id. at 309–10 (citing Joel Feinberg, The Child’s Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD? 
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 124, 126 (William Aiken & 
Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980)). 
125 Id. 
126 Kirstin Rabe Smolensky, Parental Tort Liability for Direct Preimplantation Genetic 
Interventions: Technological Harms, the Social Model of Disability, and Questions of Identity, 60 
HASTINGS L.J. 411, 418 (2008) [hereinafter Smolensky, Technological Harms]. 
127 Despite her assertion that disability prevents children from having an open future, 
Smolensky supports tort liability only when the parents have physically intervened in their 
child’s genetic makeup.  Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 301.  Parents who 
use PGD to determine which embryo to implant would not be liable, however, because the 
child cannot be said to have suffered harm because the child would not have existed if the 
parents had chosen a different embryo.  Id. at 331–32 (applying Derek Parfit’s Non-Identity 
Problem); see also DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 351–79 (1987). 
128 Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 319–21. 
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unconscious and another person removed their sense of 
hearing.129 
Smolensky argues that courts could reach this same conclusion under the 
open future approach.130 
With respect to negligence, Smolensky argues that parents have “a 
duty to act as . . . reasonably prudent parent[s] when making 
preimplantation genetic choices.”131  Juries would decide whether 
parents have violated this duty based upon the circumstances 
surrounding the parents’ decision to use genetic intervention.132  
Presumably, this duty is breached when parents choose to give their 
child traits that violate the child’s right to an open future.133   
Smolensky argues that neither parental tort immunity nor 
constitutional parental rights should insulate parents from liability for 
selecting attributes that violate a child’s right to an open future.134  This is 
so, she says, because parental rights do not extend to actions that are 
harmful or not in the best interests of the child.135  Parental tort immunity 
                                                 
129 Id. at 319–20.  In her response, Smolensky clarifies that it is not the mere experience of 
these disabilities that is “offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity,” but rather the 
creation of these genetic traits that she believes is objectively offensive.  Smolensky, 
Technological Harms, supra note 126, at 421–22.  It is not clear, how, if it all, this distinction 
matters.  After all, if choosing a particular trait is offensive, it must be so because the trait is 
in some way offensive or harmful.  Otherwise, choosing any trait would be offensive—a 
position Smolensky clearly disputes. 
Smolensky’s illustration makes two dangerous assumptions.  First, it assumes that 
what is “reasonable” is whatever seems normal to “most people.”  Unusual and 
unreasonable are entirely different inquiries.  Second, it assumes that the offense 
experienced has something to do with the new physical attribute (deafness) rather than the 
change in physical traits imposed without consent.  Many persons with dark skin would be 
offended if someone bleached their skin while they were unconscious, but that is not 
because light skin offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity.  Indeed, we cannot 
assume that light skin offends a reasonable sense of  personal dignity even if “most people” 
have dark skin and “most people” would be offended by having their skin bleached 
without consent.  The confusion with respect to consent arguments is discussed in Part 
III.B. 
130 Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 319–20. 
131 Id. at 323; see also supra note 62 and text accompanying note 104 (providing a criticism 
of the reasonably prudent parent standard). 
132 Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 323 n.137. 
133 Id. at 344–45. 
134 Id. at 314–17, 328–30. 
135 Id. at 328–30.  This argument, of course, assumes that courts are able to effectively and 
accurately determine whether the child has suffered cognizable harm without unwarranted 
intrusion into family affairs.  But how could courts make such a determination if not by 
reference to general stereotypes and social assumptions?  The very purpose of parental tort 
immunity and constitutional protection of parental decisions is to prevent the state from 
interfering with family affairs except when clearly necessary to protect a child.  If these 
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should not apply because “genetic interventions that select for a 
disability would result in reduced health and capabilities.”136  Smolensky 
also concludes that “[w]here children might be harmed by their parents’ 
constitutionally protected decision making, the State should limit the 
parents’ rights.”137 
Although Smolensky raises important ethical and legal issues, her 
proposal leaves a number of questions unanswered.  Smolensky asserts 
that there is a real threat of parents harming their children by 
engineering characteristics associated with disability.  But she also 
admits that the two kinds of disability she discusses—deafness and 
achondroplasia—are not necessarily harmful to children.138  Smolensky 
would leave it to judges and juries to decide which characteristics 
associated with disability are indeed harmful.139  Yet Smolensky never 
addresses the question of whether judges and juries are better at 
evaluating the effects of genetic intervention than parents.  Nor does she 
consider how her proposal would affect genetic diversity and public 
perceptions of disability. 
2. Responses to Smolensky 
Three scholars have responded directly to Smolensky’s call for 
imposing liability on parents who use genetic intervention to have a 
child with physical traits associated with disability.  Smolensky has 
responded to these comments by clarifying some of her theories and 
backing away from others.  Next, this Article introduces the way two of 
these responses recast the problem Smolensky posed. 
a. The Dangers of Genetic Intervention 
Professor Jamie King writes in favor of Smolensky’s basic premise 
that “children should be able to sue their parents for harmful 
                                                                                                             
doctrines are only considered after the court has evaluated the parents’ decisions according 
to the court’s standards, then these doctrines serve no purpose. 
136 Id. at 317. 
137 Id. at 329. 
138 Smolensky’s position on this is not entirely clear.  On one hand, she states that all 
traits that qualify as disabilities under the ADA should be found to be cognizable harms.  
Smolensky, Technological Harms, supra note 126, at 418.  On the other hand, she advocates a 
case-by-case evaluation of the effects of the chosen attributes on the child.  Smolensky, 
Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 340–41. 
139 Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 300 (“Given the specter of eugenics, it 
may be best to have the tort system, rather than the government, determine which traits are 
harmful.” (footnote omitted)). 
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preimplantation genetic manipulations.”140  However, King argues that a 
federal regulatory scheme would be more effective than tort liability.141  
King finds the open future test for harm appropriate in the context of 
genetic interventions, but she notes that at least some of the disabilities 
that Feinberg assumes violate a child’s right to an open future are no 
longer considered as damning as they once were.142  Given the changing 
status of various disabilities, determining whether a child has suffered 
harm “will require juries to make value judgments about which 
disabilities are so severe as to violate the child’s right to an open 
future.”143 
Ultimately, King supports Smolensky’s assertion that parents should 
be treated as owing a duty to their offspring to act as reasonably prudent 
parents.144  King asserts, however, that this duty should not just apply to 
decisions to produce a child with a disability but to “all ART choices 
made prior to embryo transfer.”145  Thus, King promotes a balancing test, 
in which the benefits of genetic intervention would be weighed against 
the risks and harms.146  She argues that this balancing should not just 
consider the merits of the genetic trait chosen by the parent, but also the 
risks inherent in the process of genetic intervention and the potential 
benefits to the child of sharing the same physical traits as the child’s 
parents.147 
Notably, King recognizes that in some situations a child might be 
better off growing up with a disability than without one.148  In King’s 
view, however, it will be a long time before those benefits outweigh the 
inherent risks of genetic intervention.149  Nonetheless, King states, “[i]f 
researchers eliminate the risks associated with embryonic gene therapy, 
in some instances, a reasonable parent, considering all of the risks and 
                                                 
140 Jaime King, Duty to the Unborn:  A Response to Smolensky, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 377, 377 
(2008). 
141 Id. at 392. 
142 Id. at 387–88. 
143 Id. at 384. 
144 Id. at 392. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 388–89. 
147 Id. at 387. 
148 Id. at 389. 
149 Id. at 387.  King states the following: 
Parents who wish to engage in direct genetic manipulation to produce 
a child with a disabling trait should have a very hard time finding a 
physician who would perform the procedure, and proving to a jury 
that they did not intend to harm their child, or that they acted as 
reasonably prudent parents. 
Id. 
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benefits, could find that her child may have a better life with the 
disability than without.”150 
b. A Disability Rights Perspective 
In response to Smolensky’s article, Professor Alicia R. Ouellette 
explains what she calls a “disability rights perspective” of Smolensky’s 
proposal.151  Although noting that she “often disagree[s] with the 
reactionary response of some disability rights activists to perceived 
slights,”152 Ouellette expresses concern that the open future approach 
might offend persons with disabilities because it relies upon stigmatizing 
assumptions about disability.153 
Ouellette explains that the open future approach Smolensky adopts 
from Feinberg assumes that disability is inherently harmful: 
In his work, Feinberg unabashedly accepts as true the 
myth of the tragedy of life with disability.  He asserts 
that a newborn child born with blindness, deafness, or 
permanent paralysis has “[]impaired faculties that are 
essential to the existence and advancement of any 
ulterior interests.”  He describes such conditions as “so 
far below a reasonable minimum as to be inescapably 
degrading and sordid.”  He suggests that being born 
with a disability “is not merely to have ‘bad luck.’ It is to 
be dealt a card from a stacked deck in a transaction that 
is not a ‘game’ so much as a swindle.”154 
The view that disability is inherently tragic and limiting derives 
from the traditional definition of disability by medical professionals as a 
physiological flaw to be treated, cured, or condemned.155  This “medical 
model” of disability has been repeatedly deconstructed and debunked 
                                                 
150 Id. at 388. 
151 Ouellette, Insult to Injury, supra note 49, at 398.  Ouellette does not indicate whether 
she agrees with this perspective; instead, she argues that this perspective must be 
considered because “[n]ot only do people with disabilities have the most at stake in the 
discussions, disability scholars are experts in identifying and preventing social oppression 
of people with disabilities.”  Id. at 399–400. 
152 Id. at 399. 
153 Id. at 402. 
154 Id. (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL 
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW:  HARM TO OTHERS 98–99 (1984)). 
155 Id. at 400; see also infra notes 178–81 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional 
medical model of disability). 
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by disability scholars.156  In place of the medical model of disability, 
disability scholars have advanced a “social model” of disability that 
corresponds with other minority perspectives.157  The social model of 
disability recognizes that many (and sometimes all) of the limitations 
that are associated with disability derive not from physical impairment 
but from “[a]rchitectural, attitudinal, sensory, political, and economic 
barriers.”158 
Ouellette argues that Feinberg’s characterizations of disability “are 
as inaccurate as they are demeaning.”159  She notes that empirical and 
anecdotal evidence suggests that persons who have not experienced 
disability “grossly underestimate the value of life with disability.”160  As 
a result, Ouellette advocates a “disability-sensitive” approach that would 
treat genetic intervention in favor of disability no differently than genetic 
interventions that attempt to impose any kind of enhancement upon an 
embryo.161  “[A] decision to choose disability is no different from a 
decision to use other genetic enhancements to shape a future child for 
nontherapeutic purposes.”162  Rather than “sorting among manufactured 
phenotypes to determine which constitute legally cognizable harms,” 
Ouellette argues that the law should “ask whether adding, deleting, or 
modifying an embryo’s DNA to produce the parents’ desired genotype is 
itself a legal wrong.”163  This approach, Ouellette asserts, avoids 
offending the sensibilities of persons with disabilities and provides 
redress for any child whose identity has been unnecessarily manipulated 
through genetic intervention.164 
By connecting the language of the open future approach to the 
outdated medical model of disability, Ouellette makes significant 
headway toward reorienting the discussion of disability.165  But 
Ouellette’s focus on the possibility of offending persons with disabilities 
does not, by itself, provide a persuasive argument against Smolensky’s 
                                                 
156 Ouellette, Insult to Injury, supra note 49, at 400; see also infra note 178–86 and 
accompanying text (explaining the shift from the traditional medical model of disability to 
a social model of disability). 
157 Ouellette, Insult to Injury, supra note 49, at 401; see also infra note 184–87 and 
accompanying text (discussing the adoption of a social model of disability). 
158 Ouellette, Insult to Injury, supra note 49, at 401. 
159 Id. at 402. 
160 Id. at 403. 
161 Id. at 406. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 407. 
164 Id. at 409. 
165 Indeed, I agree with Ouellette’s ultimate conclusion that genetic intervention in favor 
of disability be treated the same as any other attempt at genetic enhancement. 
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proposal.166  To be sure, it is good to avoid using legal doctrines that 
offend or belittle a portion of the population.  This concern, however, 
weighs lightly when the life of a child is at stake.  Few would argue that 
we should permit parents to harm their children simply because the 
basis for liability does not acknowledge the perspective of one group. 
Focusing on Ouellette’s critique of the medical model of disability, 
Smolensky responds by arguing that even if disability is not inherently 
limiting, the continuing existence of social and environmental barriers 
for persons with disabilities warrants treating disability as a cognizable 
injury.167  Smolensky willingly disclaims Feinberg’s “offensive” 
characterization of life with a disability, but maintains that the open 
future test remains a viable tool for measuring cognizable harm.168 
What we are left with, then, are a number of line-drawing questions 
that seem to depend upon how disability is characterized.  Is there a real 
threat of children being harmed by parents using genetic intervention in 
favor of disability?  Or should genetic intervention be treated as a harm 
in itself?  If we do attempt to identify when genetic intervention is 
harmful, should we define the consequences of disability normatively or 
descriptively?  And who is best qualified to make determinations about 
the advantages and disadvantages of socially disfavored physical traits? 
III.  TAKING A STEP BACK:  POLICY ARGUMENTS 
A. A Neglected Question 
A compelling question underlies much of the debate over whether 
parents should be held liable in tort for making genetic choices in favor 
of disability:  Why would a parent choose to give her child a disability?  
Very little has been written in an attempt to answer this question.169  
                                                 
166 Ouellette also recognizes that the open future framework could “have the unintended 
effect of reinforcing negative societal perceptions about disability in a way that further 
marginalizes and alienates the disability community.”  Ouellette, Insult to Injury, supra note 
49, at 403. 
167 Smolensky, Technological Harms, supra note 126, at 418–21. 
168 Id. 
169 There are likely two reasons for the dearth of information about why some parents 
might seek to give their child physical traits associated with disability.  First, there are very 
few parents who actively seek to have a child with disfavored physical characteristics.  See 
infra note 173 (showing statistics that only a relatively small portion of parents would 
prefer to have a deaf child).  Second, parents who are likely to select in favor of disability 
do not speak openly because of the stigma associated with having a child with a disability.  
See, e.g., Carina Dennis, Deaf by Design, 431 NATURE 894 (Oct. 2004), available at 
http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/article.php?id=1516 (quoting Carol Padden as saying, 
“[d]eaf people know that it’s a very risky thing to say in public that you would consider 
genetic testing to have a deaf child”).  One exception to the general tendency to give short 
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Although some commentators acknowledge that there may be 
circumstances where disability is not a detriment, this perspective is 
usually offered only to qualify the more general assumption that 
disability is itself a kind of injury.170  As a result, parents who are willing 
to take active measures to conceive a child with a disability are often 
characterized as selfish, unreasonable, or politically radical.171 
Two points must be emphasized at the outset.  First, not all persons 
with a particular disability would like to have a child with the same 
disability, and even those who do might not be willing to use genetic 
intervention to that end.  Headlines like, “Deaf Demand Right to 
Designer Deaf Children” suggest that all deaf persons would seek to 
have a deaf child.172  Within the Deaf and disabled communities, 
however, there are a variety of viewpoints on this issue, and apparently 
only a small number of deaf or disabled parents say they would consider 
using genetic testing to make sure their child is deaf.173 
                                                                                                             
shrift to the psychological and cultural motives of parents with disabilities who seek to 
have a disabled child is the analysis in Davis’s book.  See DAVIS, supra note 8, at 61–90.  
Although I disagree with Davis’s ultimate conclusion that fertility professionals should 
refuse to assist Deaf parents in having a deaf child, she does attempt to analyze the diverse 
motives of parents who want to have a deaf child.  Id. at 82. 
170 See, e.g., N. Levy, Deafness, Culture, and Choice, 28 J. MED. ETHICS, 284–85 (2002) 
(discussing the current controversy on the parental choice of creating a deaf child); 
Smolensky, Technological Harms, supra note 126, at 418–20 (suggesting that most, if not all, 
traits defined as disabilities under the ADA should be considered legally cognizable 
injuries).  Even Ouellette seems to fall into this presumption in titling her article “Insult to 
Injury.”  Ouellette, Insult to Injury, supra note 49.  If the “insult” is the stigmatizing 
language of the open future framework, the “injury,” it appears, is disability. 
171 See, e.g., K.W. Anstey, Are Attempts to Have Impaired Children Justifiable?, 28 J. MED. 
ETHICS 286, 286–88 (2002) (suggesting that parents seek to have a deaf child for political 
reasons, a practice which takes them outside the “moral community”); Fox, supra note 23, 
at 582 (suggesting parents who avoid socially disfavored physical traits “prefer not to 
sacrifice their children on the altar of moral principle, or in support of a political cause, 
even a very worthy one”); Levy, supra note 170, at 285 (arguing deaf parents seek to have 
deaf children because of apparent misplaced fears caused by the parents’ own difficult 
childhood); Karen E. Schiavone, Comment, Playing The Odds Or Playing God? Limiting 
Parental Ability To Create Disabled Children Through Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 73 ALB. 
L. REV. 283, 298 (2009) (“[P]arents who desire to have children with disabilities, and do so 
intentionally, are doing so to satisfy their own autonomy and their own needs, without 
respect to the future autonomy of the child in question.”). 
172 Templeton, supra note 32. 
173 DAVIS, supra note 8, at 79; Elizabeth A. Chen & Judith F. Schiffman, Attitudes Toward 
Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Diagnosis Among a Group of Individuals with Physical 
Disabilities, 9 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 137, 137 (2000); Anna Middleton et al., Prenatal 
Diagnosis for Inherited Deafness—What is the Potential Demand?, 10 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 
121, 121 (2001) [hereinafter Middleton et al., What is the Potential Demand?] (providing 
survey showing that only two percent of deaf persons surveyed would prefer to have a 
deaf child and would consider terminating a pregnancy if prenatal testing showed they 
were going to have a child with hearing impairments); Anna Middleton et al., Attitudes of 
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Second, although discussions about genetic intervention refer 
broadly to “disabilities” and “genetic defects,” there are really two kinds 
of disability that we know parents with disabilities have expressed an 
interest in selecting through genetic intervention—deafness and 
achondroplasia.174  Although there may be other forms of disability that 
are so connected with identity that parents would seek to engineer those 
characteristics, there is no reason to assume that, if permitted, parents 
would pay thousands of dollars to engineer children with all sorts of 
disabilities and diseases.  Hypothesizing about parents purposely 
engineering the genes for breast cancer may be philosophically 
interesting, but it provides little insight into the reality of why parents 
might choose to use genetic intervention.175 
There is nothing new about parents wanting to have children who 
share the parents’ physical attributes.  Adopting parents, for example, 
often state a preference for children who share the parents’ racial 
background.176  To the extent that parents with disabilities view their 
disabilities as a part of their identities, it is not surprising that some 
might want to have children who can share that identity.  Most 
nondisabled fertile couples can assume that their children will share 
their physical attributes without any need for genetic intervention.  
Because deafness is less common, and because parents with 
achondroplasia face risks of having a child born with a fatal condition, 
these parents cannot count on biology to pass these traits on to their 
children.177 
                                                                                                             
Deaf Adults Toward Genetic Testing for Hereditary Deafness, 63 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 1175, 
1175 (1998) [hereinafter Middleton et al., Attitudes of Deaf Adults] (finding 16% of deaf 
persons studied would consider using prenatal diagnosis and that of these, only 29% 
would prefer to have a deaf child); cf. Jeanne Weir Brunger et al., Parental Attitudes Toward 
Genetic Testing for Pediatric Deafness, 67 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 1621, 1621 (2000) (presenting 
study of parents who are not deaf but have deaf children that found that 96% of such 
parents were in favor of genetic testing for deafness; however, none of these parents said 
they would terminate a pregnancy upon learning that their child is going to be deaf). 
174 There is, however, one report of non-disabled parents seeking to use PGD to have a 
child with Down syndrome.  Melissa Healy, Fertility’s New Frontier, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 
2003, http://articles.latimes.com/2003/jul/21/health/he-pgd21. 
175 Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 320 (discussing consequences of 
parents selecting genes associated with breast cancer). 
176 See Twila L. Perry, Transracial Adoption and Gentrification:  An Essay on Race, Power, 
Family and Community, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 25, 30–34 (2006) (indicating that most 
commonly, black children adopted from foster care are adopted by black women, not by 
whites). 
177 If both parents have achondroplasia, there is a 50% chance the child will be born with 
achondroplasia and a 25% chance the child will be born with double-dominant syndrome, 
which usually leads to death of the child at birth or shortly afterward.  See Frequently Asked 
Questions, supra note 11. 
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There is a growing academic and cultural movement toward 
questioning traditional assumptions about disability and identity.  As 
discussed above, over the past thirty years, disability scholars have 
challenged the traditional portrayal of disability as a medical flaw.  The 
traditional medical model of disability178 assumed that disability is a 
problem existing within the bodies of persons who are physically 
different.179  Disability was treated as a physiological phenomenon that 
must be cured or corrected,180 or in the language of genetics and 
products liability, a “defect” to be avoided or ameliorated.181  Laboring 
under the assumptions of the medical model, persons with disabilities 
were expected to prove their moral and emotional validity by 
“overcoming” their physical states and trying to approximate the lives of 
nondisabled persons.182  Under the medical model, access and 
employment rights were viewed as special treatment charitably 
bestowed upon persons with inherently broken bodies.183 
Following on the heels of the civil rights movement, the disability 
rights movement rejected the medical model and adopted a minority-
group model of disability.184  This social model of disability recognizes 
that, for most people with disabilities, discrimination is a much greater 
obstacle than any physical impairment.185  The social model of disability 
thus calls for social and environmental changes to give persons with 
                                                 
178 I refer to the medical model in the past tense here because it is no longer the dominant 
model for discussing disability.  Unfortunately, however, the assumptions underlying the 
medical model persist.  See generally Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn’t “Just Right”:  
The Entrenchment of the Medical Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 IND. L.J. 181 
(2008) (portraying the medical model of disability as a “Goldilocks” dilemma:  people with 
disabilities are either too disabled or not disabled enough). 
179 Paul K. Longmore, The Second Phase:  From Disability Rights to Disability Culture, in 
WHY I BURNED MY BOOK AND OTHER ESSAYS ON DISABILITY 217 (2003); see also Wendy F. 
Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 141, 146–47 (2005). 
180 Hensel, supra note 179, at 146–47; Longmore, supra note 179, at 217. 
181 See Shepherd supra note 19, at 764. 
182 See, e.g., Longmore, supra note 179, at 232. 
183 Id. at 219. 
184 Id. at 218; Hensel, supra note 179, at 147; Michael E. Waterstone & Michael Ashley 
Stein, Disabling Prejudice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1351, 1356–57 (2008). 
185 Hensel, supra note 179, at 147; Longmore, supra note 179, at 218.  There are differing 
conceptions of this social model.  Some suggest that the obstacles associated with disability 
are purely social and environmental, while others argue that these obstacles are partially 
the result of the physical condition and partially the result of discrimination.  Adam M. 
Samaha, What Good is the Social Model of Disability?, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1255 (2007).  
Proponents of the social model generally agree, however, that the key to combating 
discrimination and oppression is to demand social and environmental changes.  Id. at 1267–
68. 
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disabilities equal access to social and economic activities.186  The social 
model of disability provided the basis for disability rights legislation, 
like the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, which introduced a 
definition of disability that, in part, recognized the social construction of 
disability.187 
Rejection of the medical model did not just provide justification for 
equal opportunities.  It also allowed for persons with disabilities to take 
control of their own identities.  Unfettered by the stigmatizing 
assumptions of the medical model, persons with disabilities could 
reevaluate majority values about physical difference.188  Drawing from 
their own experience, some persons with disabilities have expressed 
values quite different from nondisabled norms.189  As Professor Paul 
Longmore explains, “They declare that they prize not self-sufficiency but 
self-determination, not independence but interdependence, not 
functional separateness but personal connection, not physical autonomy 
but human community.”190  Longmore argues that these sublime values 
are desperately needed in American society: 
American culture is in the throes of an alarming and 
dangerous moral and social crisis, a crisis of values.  The 
disability movement can advance a much-needed 
perspective on this situation.  It can offer a critique of the 
hyperindividualistic majority norms institutionalized in 
the medical model and at the heart of the contemporary 
American crisis.  That analysis needs to be made, not 
just because majority values are impossible for people 
with disabilities to match up to, but, as important, 
because they have proved destructive for everyone, 
disabled and nondisabled alike.191 
This analysis suggests that those parents who select in favor of disability 
may do so not to press a political agenda or strengthen a shrinking 
population, but in an effort to perpetuate their own positive values and 
                                                 
186 Longmore, supra note 179, at 218; Waterstone & Stein, supra note 184, at 1357. 
187 Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures:  Judicial Interpretations of the 
Meaning of Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 53, 59 (2000).  The ADA’s expansive 
definition of disability has been called “transformative” because it seeks to displace social 
norms regarding what it means to be disabled.  Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword:  Socio-
Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 476, 479–80 (2000).  But see Samaha, supra note 
185, at 1280 (claiming the social model of disability has no policy implications). 
188 Longmore, supra note 179, at 221–22. 
189 Id. at 222. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
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culture.  Sharon Duchesneau and Candace McCullough, a Deaf couple 
who actively pursued having a deaf child, explain their perspective: 
Our view . . . is that being deaf is a positive thing, with 
many wonderful aspects.  We don’t view being deaf 
along the same lines as being blind or mentally retarded; 
we see it as paralleling being Jewish or black.  We don’t 
see members of those minority groups wanting to 
eliminate themselves.192 
Parents often attempt to control their children’s options in an effort 
to instill values and develop cultural understanding.  Wealthy parents 
sometimes deny their child access to family funds because they want the 
child to develop a strong work ethic and know the joy of 
accomplishment.  Parents intentionally limit with whom their child 
interacts, where the child goes to school, and what activities the child 
pursues.  These restrictions may significantly limit the child’s 
opportunities in life, but, as the parents recognize, they also create 
opportunities to develop character and values. 
Admittedly, limiting a child’s access to funds or activities is a far cry 
from intentional manipulation of a child’s DNA.193  But all of these 
limiting measures recognize the same principle:  that one’s values and 
identity are strongly influenced by one’s circumstances.  Parents who 
wish to use genetic intervention to change their child’s physical 
characteristics are attempting to shape the child’s circumstances in life, 
and thereby affect the child’s culture and character. 
There are, of course, additional, sometimes related reasons why 
parents with certain socially disfavored physical traits might want their 
child to share those traits.  Deaf parents might be concerned that they 
will have difficulty maintaining a close relationship with their child if the 
child does not share their culture and primary language.194  They may 
                                                 
192 Dominic Lawson, Of Course a Deaf Couple Want a Deaf Child, INDEP. (London), Mar. 11, 
2008, at 40; see also Dolnick, supra note 10, at 38 (“So strong is the feeling of cultural 
solidarity that many deaf parents cheer on discovering that their baby is deaf.”). 
193 One distinction between these social measures and genetic intervention is cost.  DAVIS, 
supra note 8, at 36–39.  Davis argues that the costs of directed procreation, whether by 
genetic intervention or otherwise, is so high that it gives parents a sense of entitlement to a 
child that meets the parents’ preconceived notions about what the child should do in life.  
Id.  This concern, however, cautions against permitting genetic intervention generally; it 
does not suggest that parents should be prohibited from choosing only certain, socially 
disfavored characteristics. 
194 Id. at 77–78.  Some have argued that preference should be given in adoption to parents 
who share the same race and culture as the child.  See 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2006) 
(establishing preference for adoption of Indian children by Indian parents); Perry, supra 
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also be concerned that, as hearing parents increasingly use genetic 
testing to avoid having a deaf child, the Deaf community will shrink, 
and so too will understanding and appreciation of Deaf perspectives.195 
To the extent that genetic intervention appears to be the wrong way 
of perpetuating one’s values and identity, we must ask why this is so.  
But if we claim that genetic intervention is wrongful only when used to 
favor certain physical traits, we must ask what, if anything, makes those 
kinds of genetic interventions different from genetic interventions in 
favor of other physical traits.  To start this inquiry, we must look to the 
policies underlying arguments in favor of imposing tort liability on 
parents who use genetic intervention to have a child with a disability. 
B. Policies Underlying Arguments for Parental Tort Liability 
The policies that are invoked in favor of parental tort liability fall 
generally into two camps.  First, some policies, if credited, support 
prohibiting genetic intervention altogether or with limited exceptions.  
These policies treat genetic intervention as wrongful in itself, regardless 
of which physical attributes are the object of the intervention.  There is 
no need for a decision maker to define which physical attributes are 
harmful and which are not.  The very act of intervention is harmful. 
The second camp consists of policies that may be invoked to support 
prohibiting a certain kind of genetic intervention, that is, the use of 
genetic intervention to give a child physical attributes that are believed 
by some to be harmful, such as disabilities.  Although these policies may 
be appealing on their face, they provide no workable means of 
determining when liability is appropriate.  Moreover, it is doubtful that 
there is a serious need to prohibit parents from using genetic 
intervention to choose traits that are generally assumed to be harmful. 
1. Genetic Intervention as a Moral Wrong 
Some oppose genetic interventions that result in disability based on 
a general conviction that genetic intervention is wrong.  This position 
may derive from a belief that humans should not further tinker with the 
natural course of conception and identity, that genetic engineering will 
ultimately dilute positive social values, that intervention is 
fundamentally unfair to the unborn child, or some other moral 
                                                                                                             
note 176, at 30 (describing positions on transracial adoption).  A similar concern expressed 
by some Deaf persons is that hearing parents cannot properly raise a deaf child because 
hearing parents are outsiders to Deaf culture.  Dolnick, supra note 10, at 51; see also DAVIS, 
supra note 8, at 76. 
195 DAVIS, supra note 8, at 66–69. 
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framework.196  Virtually every advancement in artificial reproductive 
technology has been—at least initially—met with moral opposition.197  
Over time, opposition has waned to each new technology.198  This does 
not mean, of course, that we must assume that genetic intervention is 
morally acceptable.  It simply means that, for better or worse, views on 
the subject are likely to change over time. 
In any case, if genetic intervention is wrong in itself, it is wrong no 
matter what traits are being chosen in the process.  This remains true 
even if we find a basis for minor exceptions to a general policy opposing 
genetic intervention.  The kind and scope of those exceptions vary 
depending on the ethical framework motivating categorical opposition 
to intervention.  Thus, for example, if one opposes intervention because 
it effects a change in the child without the child’s consent, then one will 
likely hold that intervention is not tortious if the intervention is one we 
assume any child would certainly consent to, such as an intervention 
necessary to save the life of the child.199  If, however, one opposes 
intervention because it alters a child’s identity, one will likely oppose 
interventions that are deemed significant enough to affect identity, but 
permit interventions that are deemed less substantial.200 
Recognizing these kinds of exceptions is different—theoretically and 
practically—from saying that parents should be held liable when they 
choose certain physical traits (such as deafness or short stature) but not 
others (such as blue eyes or fair skin).  In the first situation, the 
intervention is itself wrongful, but we are willing to excuse the wrong for 
what we assume to be a greater good.  Because this scenario starts from 
the assumption that intervention is wrongful, the intervention will not be 
permitted unless found to offer significant benefits to the child or society.  
Under this framework, the decision maker must determine when the 
danger of refraining from intervention is significant enough to warrant 
departure from the moral grounds calling for prohibition of such 
techniques. 
                                                 
196 See, e.g., Fox, supra note 23, at 572–74. 
197 Andrews & Elster, supra note 79, at 35–38.  Smolensky makes it a point to note that 
“disability advocates” have always opposed new fertility technologies.  Smolensky, Genetic 
Interventions, supra note 9, at 301.  Although this may be true to some degree, disability 
advocates are certainly not the only ones who approach new fertility technologies with a 
degree of suspicion. 
198 Andrews & Elster, supra note 79, at 35–38. 
199 This approach arguably follows tort cases where consent is implied by operation of 
law for medical assistance in emergencies.  See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 56, 
at 117. 
200 See I. Glenn Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, the Non-Identity Problem, and Legal 
Liability, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 347, 350–59 (2008); Fox, supra note 23, at 594–95. 
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In the second scenario, intervention is not considered wrongful in 
itself, so any intervention is permissible so long as it does not do legally 
cognizable harm.201  Under this framework, the decision maker is not 
determining whether to avoid some catastrophe but rather guessing at 
the consequences different physical traits might have on future children.  
As discussed below, this is a much more complicated and difficult 
decision because it requires sorting through the multifarious advantages 
and disadvantages that each physical trait might have on a child who is 
not yet born. 
There is confusion in this area because some of the rationales given 
to support categorical opposition to genetic intervention do not quite fit.  
For example, some suggest that intervention is wrongful, in part, 
because it is done without the consent of the child.202  The problem, 
however, is that no child ever has a say in choosing her genetic makeup 
regardless of whether genetic intervention is used.203  Alternatively, even 
if we assume that there is some form of consent lacking in genetic 
intervention, a child would be hard-pressed to prove that, had she been 
given a choice at some metaphysical moment before her genes were 
chosen, she would have rejected the physical traits the parents preferred.  
The most a child could do is point to evidence that people generally 
disfavor the physical attribute chosen by the parent and argue, by 
extension, that she would have rejected the physical trait, as well. 
Thus, in the context of genetic intervention, consent arguments have 
less to do with the autonomy of the child and more to do with denying 
the will of nature or the generalized assumptions of society.  This is an 
important distinction.  It is one thing to say a person should have an 
opportunity to express or deny consent to medical procedures.  It is quite 
another to say that unborn children have the right to be born with certain 
attributes that are socially favored.  The latter argument is not about 
consent but rather an assertion that some physical traits are intrinsically 
better than others.204 
Consent aside, it is possible that there are very good policy reasons 
to oppose genetic intervention categorically.  As King points out, genetic 
intervention could have unanticipated negative physical 
                                                 
201 This framework is referred to as the modern traditionalist approach.  See Smolensky, 
Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 308 (indicating that modern traditionalists view 
reproductive choice as a basic freedom that exists so long as it aids in successful 
reproduction and does not cause direct harm to society or others). 
202 E.g., id. at 319. 
203 For example, I never had the opportunity to choose blue eyes and a muscular build, 
and this has nothing to do with whether my parents engaged in genetic intervention. 
204 See supra Part III.A (discussing problems with this assertion). 
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consequences.205  Additionally, Dov Fox argues that, if left unregulated, 
genetic engineering of children would “undermine civic compassion by 
entrenching perceptions of human control over individual identity and 
social advantage.”206  These rationales do not call for sorting through the 
advantages and disadvantages of different physical traits or for 
presuming disfavored physical traits constitute cognizable harms.  If 
anything, these policies call for a general prohibition with exceptions for 
unusual situations. 
2. Concern that Children May Be Harmed 
There are some parents who knowingly or recklessly place their 
children in danger.  Some mothers use illegal drugs during pregnancy.  
Some parents neglect their children.  Other parents engage in abuse.  It 
appears, however, there is little cause for concern that parents will use 
genetic intervention to give their child traits that parents know to be 
detrimental to the child.  Parents who go to the expense of using genetic 
intervention to choose a trait for their child will likely do so believing 
that the trait will benefit the child.207 
Good intentions, however, do not always lead to good results.  Thus, 
a third potential reason for holding parents who choose disfavored 
physical traits through genetic intervention liable is that children might 
suffer harm as a result of the chosen physical trait.  Tort law generally 
seeks to recompense persons who suffer harms unnecessarily; thus, if 
disability is a harm, then it might make sense to hold parents who 
impose such a trait on their child liable.208  Implicit in this policy 
justification is an assumption that parents will sometimes make bad 
decisions when choosing physical traits and the expense of those 
decisions should be borne by the parents. 
But determining what will be harmful or beneficial for a child, or 
even what will limit or expand life opportunities for a child, is no simple 
task.  As King notes, a child born deaf might face challenges in 
communicating with those who are not deaf, but the child may also 
benefit from being a part of the Deaf community, or if the parents are 
                                                 
205 King, supra note 140, at 381. 
206 Fox, supra note 23, at 619. 
207 Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 319.  There certainly may be 
exceptions, such as parents who try to serve their own interests in reckless disregard for the 
child.  The possibility of this sort of recklessness, however, does not call for questioning all 
parental decisions in favor of disability.  Rather, it calls for enforcing existing criminal and 
civil laws against persons who intentionally or recklessly cause emotional distress.  See Ann 
M. Haralambie, Children’s Domestic Tort Claims, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 525 (2006). 
208 See DAVIS, supra note 8, at 53–56 (discussing the role of tort law in reproductive 
technology). 
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themselves deaf, from sharing the physical and cultural attributes of her 
parents.209  Whether one finds greater value in communication 
opportunities or in familial and cultural bonding depends on one’s 
culture and experiences, and it would be difficult to say that one set of 
values is right while the other wrong.  Indeed, the comparison of harms 
and benefits is more likely to reflect social preferences than any inherent 
quality of the physical trait.210 
The difficulty of balancing harms and benefits persists regardless of 
whether the physical traits in question are ones commonly viewed as 
disabilities.  Giving a child six fingers on each hand might be seen as an 
enhancement to parents who dream of their child being a pianist;211 but 
to others, this may seem a cruel disfigurement that will severely limit 
social opportunities.  So too, parents might attempt to bless their child 
with the physical prowess of Michael Jordan but then damn the child 
with severe pressure to succeed as an athlete.  A child engineered with 
exceptional intelligence may suffer socially in her youth.  And there are 
myriad non-genetic interventions, such as circumcision and inoculations, 
that are just as permanent as genetic decisions and could be found to 
harm or benefit the child depending on the social situation, cultural 
mores, and later developments.  Some of these parental decisions may be 
harmful in some respect, but few people would find judicial intervention 
and parental liability are necessary to test all of these early parental 
decisions.212 
This is not to say that the question of harm is always too speculative 
to reach.  The point is, rather, that the decision about whether a physical 
trait is a harm or a benefit should not be made based upon 
overgeneralizations that having more physical ability is always better 
than having less, that some physical traits are inherently damning, or 
that everyone is better off looking like the majority of folks we see on 
television.  There is value in the broad swath of human possibilities, even 
if some of those are misunderstood by many.  When the physical trait 
chosen by the parents is not one that most people have experienced or 
                                                 
209 See King, supra note 140, at 389 (providing examples of the potential benefits of being 
born deaf).  There may very well be myriad other benefits of being deaf. 
210 See infra Part IV.C (explaining that the social benefit of a trait should not be the 
primary measure of its value). 
211 See GATTACA (Columbia Pictures Co. 1997). 
212 Smolensky admits that parents can harm their children in many ways, aside from 
genetic intervention, and still avoid civil or criminal liability.  Smolensky, Genetic 
Intervention, supra note 9, at 341–42.  She argues that parental liability for genetic 
interventions is appropriate, however, because genetic changes are permanent and parental 
misconduct can be proven more readily than other more subtle parental choices.  See id. at 
342. 
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can reasonably understand, we must be careful that the decision about 
harm is not based upon social stereotypes and cultural assumptions.  If 
people do not accurately perceive the nature of the challenges and 
opportunities faced by a person with a particular physical trait, it would 
be a mistake to give juries the final word on whether that trait is a harm 
or a benefit. 
3. The Costs of Disability on Society 
A third policy that has been asserted in support of parental tort 
liability is that persons with disabilities impose costs on the society in 
which they live.  If parents who use genetic intervention in favor of 
disability were subject to tort liability, perhaps fewer parents would use 
genetic intervention for that purpose.  This might decrease the number of 
children with disabilities and free up funds that would otherwise be 
needed to support such children. 
This rationale assumes that children with disabilities are more 
expensive than others.213  Although this may be true with regard to some 
disabilities, the two disabilities that have been potential candidates for 
genetic intervention—deafness and short stature—are not particularly 
costly.  Persons who are deaf or of short stature (or both) generally live 
independently and without high medical costs.214  Their limitations 
derive more from prejudices and environmental barriers than any 
physical limitations.215  Although it is possible that parents might use 
genetic intervention to have children with other kinds of socially 
disfavored physical characteristics, it is unlikely parents would use 
genetic intervention to choose particularly expensive traits because the 
parents will be initially responsible for the costs. 
                                                 
213 This policy also relies upon the implied assumption that society generally would be 
better off with fewer persons with disabilities and more resources.  It is a mistake, however, 
to assume that persons with disabilities cost more than they are worth.  Indeed, what little 
research there is on the subject—focusing on the utility of providing reasonable 
accommodations to employ persons with disabilities—suggests that the benefits of having 
such persons in the workplace far outweigh the costs.  Waterstone & Stein, supra note 184, 
at 1376. 
214 See DAVIS, supra note 8, at 47 (explaining that deaf people live independently and also 
refuting the social costs argument); Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 11 (explaining 
that persons of short stature generally have average life spans and live independently). 
215 See supra notes 185–86 and accompanying text (describing the social model of 
disability). 
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C. The Scope of the “Problem” 
Two observations place the policies supporting parental liability in 
context.  First, neither Smolensky nor her commentators appear to claim 
that giving a child physical attributes such as deafness or short stature 
always harms the child.216  It may very well be that children whose 
parents give them these physical traits do not suffer a cognizable harm, 
even under the open future test. 
Second, as Smolensky admits, there is not likely to be a great number 
of parents who are interested in giving their child a trait that is 
associated with disability.217  This should come as no surprise.  The costs 
of genetic engineering will be high, especially in the early years.  
Moreover, the social pressure to have a “normal” baby, that is, one who 
has attributes that are socially favored, is likely to continue to be 
immense.218  The size of the problem Smolensky is attempting to solve 
shrinks with each condition:  (1) only a small number of parents will 
want to give their child socially disfavored physical traits and will resort 
to genetic intervention to do so; (2) only some of these parents will be 
able to afford genetic intervention; (3) only some of these parents will 
follow through despite opposition from physicians and friends; and 
(4) only rarely, if ever, will the chosen trait actually do more harm to the 
child than good. 
The apparent small scope of the problem raises questions about 
whether there is a need to adopt a new standard for liability just for 
parents who choose to give their child socially disfavored traits.  Perhaps 
there is a moral basis to prevent genetic intervention generally; but if 
that is the case, there is no need to focus the inquiry on whether socially 
disfavored traits like disabilities are inherently disadvantageous.  As 
discussed in the next section, putting parental decisions in favor of 
disability on trial is likely to lead to inaccurate results and further 
entrench discrimination against those who are physically different. 
                                                 
216 Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 340–41. 
217 Id. at 300. 
218 See Shepherd, supra note 19, at 779 (“Societal pressures . . . to bring only ‘non-
defective’ children into the world, can obtain such widespread currency that they become 
assumptions of medical, legal, spiritual, and community institutions, to the point of 
obviating entirely the need for government action in this area.”); see also Longmore, supra 
note 179, at 221 (discussing the relationship between conceptions of wholeness and of being 
valid Americans). 
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IV.  THE RIGHT TO AN OPEN FUTURE IN A WORLD WHERE IRRATIONAL 
DISCRIMINATION PERSISTS 
Smolensky suggests that in the context of genetic intervention we 
should alter the standard in tort law used to determine when a genetic 
change results in a cognizable injury.219  Under her approach, judges and 
juries would ask whether the genetic intervention violated the child’s 
right to an open future.220  Using the open future analysis, Smolensky 
argues that courts should decide whether parents who select in favor of 
disability are reasonable in doing so.221 
Scholars have proposed a variety of different models for evaluating 
the legal obligations between parents and children.222  Rather than 
attempting to compare and critique these various models, this Part 
focuses on the practical problems that derive from using the open future 
test to assess the consequences of disability.  This focus points to more 
general problems with the way in which scholars, judges, and the media 
have approached the intersection between genetics and disability.  The 
open future test proposed by Smolensky fails to address the 
incompetence of juries to evaluate the consequences of disability or the 
social problems with categorizing certain socially disfavored physical 
features as harmful. 
A. Of “Sound” Bodies and “Open” Futures 
Smolensky finds some support for the open future approach in a 
series of cases that make reference to a child’s “right to begin life with a 
sound mind and body.”223  These cases, she argues, manifest a judicial 
movement toward recognizing that children have a moral right to be 
born free from impediments.224 
Even if these cases did describe a legitimate moral right, the “right to 
a sound body” provides an impossible and arbitrary standard for 
evaluating damages.  The problems with using the right to a sound body 
to determine harm are very much the same as the problems with using 
the open future framework to assess harm.  Both approaches purport to 
use an objective standard to measure harm, when in fact they rely upon 
                                                 
219 Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 337. 
220 Id. at 311.  Davis also supports the “open future” approach; however, she does not call 
for new laws to enforce it.  DAVIS, supra note 8, at 26, 30. 
221 Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 340. 
222 See Ouellette, Shaping Parental Authority, supra note 73, at 30–33. 
223 Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 302.  For the sake of brevity, I refer to 
the “right to begin life with a sound mind and body” simply as the “right to a sound 
body.” 
224 Id. at 312. 
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artificial, subjective notions about what makes a person complete.  
Ultimately, both approaches fail to measure whether the plaintiff has 
actually suffered harm and instead presume harm whenever the plaintiff 
has a different body type or experience than most people expect in life. 
In Smith v. Brennan, the New Jersey Supreme Court made the 
following comment when attempting to explain why a child should be 
permitted to recover against a third party for prenatal injuries: 
[J]ustice requires that the principle be recognized that a 
child has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind 
and body.  If the wrongful conduct of another interferes 
with that right, and it can be established by competent 
proof that there is a causal connection between the 
wrongful interference and the harm suffered by the 
child when born, damages for such harm should be 
recoverable by the child.225 
Aside from the conclusory assertion that “justice requires” the “legal 
right to begin life with a sound mind and body,” the Brennan court made 
no attempt to explain the basis or scope of this newly invented right.  
Nonetheless, a number of courts have quoted this language to support 
liability for prenatal injuries, but with little analysis of their own.226 
The problem is that this “right” is artificial and vague.  Even when 
there has been no tortious conduct, children are born with a variety of 
different characteristics and abilities, some of which might be considered 
“sound” and others that might be called “unsound.”  Simply because 
society tends to identify a certain set of characteristics as “normal” or 
“sound,” does not mean that a child has been harmed if born without 
these characteristics.  Indeed, the characteristics we associate with a 
“sound” body might not even be those that are particularly common.  
Medical studies suggest that one third of the adults in the United States 
are obese, but most people would probably not say that children have 
                                                 
225 157 A.2d 497, 503 (N.J. 1960). 
226 See, e.g., Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218, 222 (Mich. 1971); Grodin v. Grodin, 
301 N.W.2d 869, 870 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 
1967); Draper v. Jasionowski, 858 A.2d 1141, 1144 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004); Sylvia v. 
Gobeille, 220 A.2d 222, 224 (R.I. 1966); see also Jarvis v. Providence Hosp., 444 N.W.2d 236, 
239 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Hoener v. Bertinato, 171 A.2d 140, 144 (N.J. Bergen County Ct. 
1961) (referring to right to sound mind and body to support taking custody of child to 
provide blood transfusion against parents’ wishes); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924, 927 (Okla. 
1976); Leal v. C. C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 413 S.W.2d 825, 830 (Tex. App. 1967) (Cadena, 
J, dissenting), rev’d 419 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1967). 
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the right to be born with a tendency toward obesity.227  A “sound” body 
is really a body that has the characteristics those making the decisions 
prefer. 
The subjective and protean nature of the “sound body” standard 
invites decisions based upon stereotypes.  Thus, in Stallman, the Illinois 
Supreme Court expressly rejected the “right to a sound mind and body” 
language because it suggests a duty of the mother to guarantee her child 
has socially favored characteristics.228  The court asked: 
By what objective standard could a jury be guided in 
determining whether a pregnant woman did all that was 
necessary in order not to breach a legal duty to not 
interfere with her fetus’ separate and independent right 
to be born whole?  In what way would prejudicial and 
stereotypical beliefs about the reproductive abilities of 
women be kept from interfering with a jury’s 
determination of whether a particular woman was 
negligent at any point during her pregnancy?229 
By cloaking cultural conceptions in the seemingly objective measure of 
“soundness,” the right to a sound body permits juries to express their 
prejudices as though they were objective moral imperatives. 
It is true that the environment we live in appears to be more suited 
to some physical body-types than others.  A person who uses a 
wheelchair cannot always access buildings and events as easily as those 
who walk.  Persons who are exceptionally tall must duck to get into most 
cars.  And people who are perceived as not being “good-looking” face 
challenges in both their jobs and social lives.230  Although we might 
assume that judges and juries find bodies “unsound” when those bodies 
are incompatible with our social and physical environment, this is not 
necessarily true.  In fact, as discussed below, decision makers tend to 
misjudge the consequences of socially disfavored physical 
characteristics.231  Moreover, by calling certain bodies “unsound,” the 
right to a sound body jurisprudence relocates environmental and social 
                                                 
227 See Katherine M. Flegal et al., Prevalence and Trends in Obesity Among US Adults, 1999–
2008, 303 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 235, 235 (2010), available at http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/ 
content/full/303/3/235?ijkey=ijKHq6YbJn3Oo&keytype=ref&siteid=amajnls. 
228 Stallman v. Youngquist, N.E.2d 355, 359 (Ill. 1988). 
229 Id. at 360.  Shepherd makes a similar point:  “When values, risk tolerance, faith, love, 
fear, and biological impulse naturally and necessarily factor into a decision, it is impossible 
to say whether the decision is reasonable or unreasonable.”  Shepherd, supra note 19, at 805. 
230 See Jeff E. Biddle & Daniel S. Hamermesh, Beauty, Productivity, and Discrimination:  
Lawyers’ Looks and Lucre, 16 J. LAB. ECON. 172 (1998). 
231 See infra Part IV.B (discussing the misperception of disabilities). 
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problems—like discrimination and lack of access—to the physical body 
of the person being subjected to prejudice.  This displacement of fault 
onto the plaintiff discourages necessary changes to the social and 
environmental status quo. 
Thus far, none of the courts referencing the right to a sound body 
have evoked the right as a means for determining whether the plaintiff 
suffered actual harm.  The language of the “sound body” jurisprudence, 
however, seems to suggest that there is no need to consider whether the 
plaintiff is actually worse off because of defendant’s actions.  Instead, it 
would appear that the court may simply look to whether the defendant 
caused the plaintiff to have characteristics that are different from the 
court’s conception of a sound body.  Rather than evaluating whether the 
plaintiff’s physical state has had an overall harmful effect on the plaintiff, 
courts can assume harm based purely on the fact that the plaintiff is 
physically different.  This approach unfairly suggests that simply 
because a plaintiff has unusual attributes, the plaintiff must have been 
harmed.  Shepherd explains: 
Rather than signifying merely the limits of others’ 
tortious behavior, the language of the “right to a sound 
mind and body” exhibits an independence from others’ 
noxious conduct and connotes an affirmative obligation 
on the part of other people to eliminate any obstacles, 
natural or otherwise, to achieve this societal concept of a 
sound mind and body.232 
The “right to an open future” similarly invites courts to conflate 
damages with difference.  Like the right to a sound body jurisprudence, 
the open future test implies the existence of a right that does not 
normally exist.  People are born into a wide variety of circumstances 
with a variety of physical abilities.  Those who are born into poverty do 
not have the same opportunities as those born with wealth.  Those who 
are born blind do not have the same opportunities as those born sighted.  
Certainly, all persons are not born with an equal array of opportunities, 
regardless of whether their parents use genetic intervention.233 
                                                 
232 Shepherd, supra note 19, at 770.  A similar problem arises in wrongful life cases.  See 
Hensel, supra note 179, at 144 (“Rather than focusing on a defendant’s conduct, as in a 
traditional tort action, both wrongful birth and wrongful life suits ultimately focus on the 
plaintiff’s disability, a status that is at least partially a societal construction.”). 
233 Davis concedes that her reference to a “right” to an open future is more 
“metaphorical” than literal.  DAVIS, supra note 8, at 46.  She asserts, however, that having a 
child who happens to be born into poverty or is otherwise limited in opportunities is 
different from deliberately giving a child attributes that limit the child’s options.  Id. at 84.  
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Asking the question of whether a child’s right to an open future has 
been violated implies that any departure from what is commonly 
accepted as a normal future violates the child’s inalienable right.  Just as 
the right to a sound body prefers certain physical attributes, the right to 
an open future gives preference to a certain array of opportunities in life.  
A person born with hearing is limited in her ability to enter Deaf culture.  
But we are apt to treat deafness as a restriction on one’s future 
opportunities because our society tends to value hearing culture above 
Deaf culture.234  Commentators automatically assume that it is better to 
be born hearing than deaf—not because  people who cannot hear have 
less appealing opportunities in life by some objective standard, but 
because most people think that the opportunities afforded the hearing are 
better than those given the Deaf.235  The “open future” language is code 
for those generally accepted activities that most people think they want 
to experience in life.  Simply because an experience is common or valued 
highly by a dominant group does not mean that the experience is 
superior to other activities or that a child has suffered harm if she does 
not have the opportunity for those experiences.  There may well be 
                                                                                                             
This distinction suggests that what Davis calls a “right to an open future” is really a right to 
not to have one’s genetic identity manipulated in ways that might constrain one’s 
opportunities in life.  But every genetic manipulation, if effective, changes the child’s 
genetic identity and thereby changes the child’s opportunities in life.  For example, if my 
parents give me great intelligence, I might never be able to enjoy low-brow movies; if they 
give me low intelligence, I may never appreciate high-brow ones.  Davis would likely 
argue that the right to an open future is violated only if the parents’ choice prevents the 
child from having a “wide variety” of opportunities.  Id.  My concern is that what 
constitutes a “wide variety” will be decided based on overgeneralizations about what 
opportunities are valuable.  This problem is exacerbated by the implication that children 
have an independent right to activities the dominant culture deems superior. 
234 Davis argues that choosing deafness for a child violates the child’s right to an open 
future because the Deaf community is relatively small and those who are deaf often have 
difficulty with written language.  These consequences, she argues, unreasonably narrow a 
deaf child’s social and vocational opportunities.  However, even if Davis is correct about 
the scope of opportunities available to a deaf child, her conclusion that these opportunities 
are inferior to those permitted a hearing child relies upon value judgments about what 
makes for a complete life.  Is it better to be part of a large, impersonal community than to 
be part of small, intimate one?  See Dennis, supra note 169 (some assert that there is greater 
intimacy among members of the Deaf community).  Is it better to have more job and 
marriage prospects than less?  Some might say that it is better to have a few meaningful 
opportunities than to have myriad unfulfilling ones.  Simply because the dominant culture 
thinks more is better than less and bigger is better than smaller does not mean that those 
values are correct or applicable to every situation. 
235 See Jones, supra note 9, at 223 (stating genetic intervention should not be permitted 
when used for “things that virtually anyone would agree are harmful,” such as to create a 
deaf child); Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 319–20 (“Under an objective 
standard of offense the creation of genetic traits such as deafness or achondroplasia are 
almost certain to be considered offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity.”). 
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uncommon and unpopular experiences in life that are more valuable 
than the ones that most people seek.  Some may, as Longmore suggests, 
“prize not self-sufficiency but self-determination, not independence but 
interdependence, not functional separateness but personal connection, 
not physical autonomy but human community.”236 
The problems with the open future framework reflect a more 
fundamental ambiguity in the discourse regarding genetic intervention.  
Commentators frequently distinguish between “therapeutic” and 
“nontherapeutic” interventions, or between “enhancements” and 
“diminishments.”237  But these terms have meaning only by reference to 
some subjective standard for what makes a person whole.238  Some 
would consider it therapeutic to modify the DNA of an embryo that has 
the phenotype for deafness so that it has the phenotype for hearing.  
Others would consider this modification diminishing.239  In either case, 
the embryo will have a different identity and experience than it would 
have had without intervention.  As discussed in the next section, judges 
and juries cannot accurately measure the degree to which such a change 
will be an advantage or disadvantage for the child. 
B. Pervasive Misperception of Disability 
As discussed above, courts have repeatedly recognized that judges 
and juries are ill-equipped to assess accurately the subtleties of intra-
family relationships.240  This assessment becomes all the more 
problematic when the jury attempts to determine the consequences of 
physical attributes that most of them have never experienced.241  In the 
usual tort action, jurors draw from their own experiences to do what 
juries do best—decide whether conduct violates community values.  The 
open future test asks juries to do something much more speculative and 
                                                 
236 Longmore, supra note 179, at 222.  In his critique of scholarship advancing the social 
model of disability, Adam Samaha recognizes an important, though underdeveloped, 
implication of the social model of disability:  “[The social model’s insights might] suggest a 
class of decisionmakers different from the group that other perspectives suggest.”  Samaha, 
supra note 185, at 1254.  In the context of genetic interventions in favor of disability, the 
social model points to the problems with relying on outsiders to decide what it is like to 
have physical traits associated with disability. 
237 Ouellette, Shaping Parental Authority, supra note 73, at 960, 985; see also Cohen, supra 
note 200, at 349. 
238 To some extent, Cohen recognizes this problem in responding to Smolensky.  See 
Cohen, supra note 200, at 349–50. 
239 See DAVIS, supra note 8, at 67–69; Longmore, supra note 179, at 221–22. 
240 See supra note 68 and accompanying text (suggesting that social, cultural, economic, 
and philosophical factors that shape parental discretion and authority should not be 
second-guessed). 
241 A similar objection applies to wrongful life cases.  See Hensel, supra note 179, at 185. 
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subject to bias—determine the future consequences of having a 
particular physical trait.242  This inquiry adopts wholesale the 
assumption of the medical model that physical features carry inherent 
limitations that can be scientifically explained and assessed.243  Juries, 
guided by purportedly “expert” testimony from physicians who are 
steeped in the medical model, are likely to base their decisions on deep-
seated biases and negative stereotypes about disability.244  Generally, 
juries tend to “emphasize evidence consistent with [their] own views 
and attitudes while . . . discount[ing] or ignor[ing] evidence inconsistent 
with [their] attitudes.”245 
The artificial, subjective nature of the open future test is particularly 
problematic in the context of disability because people tend to 
overestimate the harms associated with disability and underestimate the 
extent to which those harms are socially created.  Carol J. Gill 
summarizes the counterintuitive results of research on quality of life and 
disability: 
A remarkably consistent finding across studies using 
widely varying samples and methods is that life 
satisfaction does not diminish with increasing degree of 
physical impairment.  In fact, several studies indicate 
that persons with “severe” physical disabilities, such as 
spinal cord quadriplegia and neuromuscular disabilities 
requiring mechanical ventilation, express greater life 
satisfaction than do those with less disabling 
conditions.246 
                                                 
242 The reference to a “right” to an open future gives the appearance that juries are 
contemplating a moral question, when in fact they are speculating about the future based 
on general assumptions. 
243 See Hensel, supra note 179, at 183 (discussing similar problematic assumptions in 
wrongful life cases). 
244 Id. at 185. 
245 M. Neil Browne et al., The Shared Assumptions of the Jury System and the Market System, 
50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 425, 454 (2006); see also Monica K. Miller, Alayna Jehle & Alicia 
Summers, From Kobe Bryant to Saddam Hussein:  A Descriptive Examination and Psychological 
Analysis of How Religion Likely Affected Twenty-Five Recent High-Profile Trials, 9 FLA. COASTAL 
L. REV. 1, 1 (2007) (noting that “jurors tend to be more lenient toward defendants who 
follow society’s norms”). 
246 Carol J. Gill, Health Professionals, Disability, and Assisted Suicide:  An Examination of 
Relevant Empirical Evidence and Reply to Batavia, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 526, 529 (2000) 
(citations omitted); see also Waterstone & Stein, supra note 184, at 1359–61 (discussing 
prevalence of unconscious discrimination “even amongst people who profess strong 
egalitarian beliefs”). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 4 [2011], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss4/6
2011] Disability and Designer Babies 1519 
This research suggests a serious flaw in the common assumption that 
having more capabilities is better than having less.  In addition, 
surprising to some, research suggests that healthcare professionals—the 
gate-keepers of ART and the most likely expert witnesses in genetic 
intervention litigation—significantly underestimate the quality of life of 
persons with disabilities.247  Gill concludes that “the gap between health 
professionals and people with disabilities in evaluating life with 
disability is consistent and stunning.”248 
The urge to prevent parents from using genetic intervention to select 
in favor of disability arguably does not come from direct hostility toward 
persons with disabilities.  It is, instead, a case of misguided 
benevolence—an impulse based upon the presumption that disability is 
inherently tragic.  Equating disability with suffering embraces the 
medical model’s central tenet that physical difference is a misfortune to 
be avoided or overcome, but not embraced.  Shepherd explains why this 
attempt at benevolence is problematic: 
 The creation of rights in response to someone’s or 
some group’s suffering assumes that we as a society can 
identify when suffering is taking place.  But suffering is 
individual and personal, and not always obvious.  Many 
well-meaning people who do not live with disabilities 
will assume that a fetus with disabilities will suffer if 
brought to term.  Yet people living with disabilities and 
persons working and living with disabled people often 
say otherwise.249 
Although the medical model of disability has been challenged 
repeatedly, commentators discussing genetics still tend to assume 
disability is synonymous with detriment.  Commentators conclude, with 
little or no analysis, that:  (1) having a disability means having fewer 
capabilities; and (2) “reasonable” people would rather have more 
abilities rather than less.250  This analysis, of course, fails to recognize 
that abilities and opportunities are not uniformly valued or 
mathematically measured; that capabilities are not inherent and 
permanent but are affected by environmental and social factors; that 
                                                 
247 Gill, supra note 246, at 530. 
248 Id. 
249 Shepherd, supra note 19, at 782; see also Dunne & Warren, supra note 28, at 168 
(“Though a noble goal worth pursuing, reducing affliction must not be accomplished by 
targeting individuals having, or perceived as having conditions considered undesirable.”). 
250 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 9, at 223; Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 
319–20. 
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having more physical functions does not necessarily mean having 
greater opportunities and happiness; and that reasonable people may 
place different values on common experiences and norms.  If even 
persons somewhat educated about disability and genetics tend to 
presume harm, it is unlikely that juries will be able to see beyond the old 
stereotype that disability is inherently tragic. 
C. The Problems with Treating Prospective Discrimination as Harm 
As discussed above, parents would face significant obstacles in 
attempting to convince a jury that a disability like deafness or short 
stature is not inevitably tragic.  This, however, is only the first great 
hurdle for parents attempting to avoid liability.  Under Smolensky’s 
approach, a genetic intervention could be considered harmful if, 
although not inherently limiting, the intervention gives the child 
attributes that subject the child to discrimination.  Returning to the 
example of parents who use genetic intervention to have a deaf child, 
Smolensky argues genetic deafness may violate the child’s right to an 
open future because “environmental factors are not changing rapidly 
enough to alleviate harm caused by a disabling trait.”251 
Smolensky is correct that persons with disabilities face significant 
social and environmental obstacles, such as prejudice and inaccessible 
areas, that arguably limit the life opportunities of persons with 
disabilities in some cases.252  She may also be correct that negative 
assumptions about disability will likely persist even in the future when 
the technology for genetic intervention is available.  But even if we 
assume that the negative social consequences of a particular disability 
will at times outweigh the benefits of the physical trait—and that it is 
possible to evaluate the benefits and burdens with any degree of 
accuracy—this does not justify holding the parents liable for choosing a 
disfavored physical trait.   
There is something sadly ironic about using the existence of 
discrimination as a reason to prevent the creation of the traits that subject 
a person to discrimination.  In effect, we are saying that even if society’s 
views are wrong, those views should constrain parents’ ability to make 
choices about their children.  As discussed below, this “social harm 
approach” is unfair to parents and would serve to further entrench 
discrimination.  In the context of genetic testing and intervention, the 
                                                 
251 Smolensky, Technological Harms, supra note 126, at 418. 
252 See Areheart, supra note 178, at 188 (asserting that many of the challenges persons with 
disabilities face are socially construed barriers that limit participation in mainstream 
society). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 4 [2011], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss4/6
2011] Disability and Designer Babies 1521 
law should take a normative rather than a descriptive approach to 
evaluating the consequences of disability. 
1. Over-Deterrence and the “New Eugenics”253 
The first problem with the social harm approach is that it rests 
precariously on the edge of a slippery slope.  If we presume a child has 
suffered legally cognizable harm whenever parents choose to give the 
child a trait that will subject the child to discrimination, then parents 
could be found liable for choosing any among a wide variety of socially 
disfavored physical traits.254  It is not difficult to imagine children 
claiming that they will suffer discrimination because of the skin color, 
gender, or other physical characteristic chosen by the parents.  Parents 
may have legitimate reasons for wanting their child to be of a particular 
race or gender or to have certain traits, such as deafness, that correspond 
with the parents’ identity and culture.  These attributes could benefit the 
child as well as the social group the child joins.  Under the social harm 
approach, however, parents risk liability if they fail to choose the 
attributes that a jury will recognize as socially beneficial. 
Because social values change over time, parents will be unable to 
know in advance which traits will subject the parents to liability years 
later when the child has reached majority and decides to sue her parents.  
This is especially hard with disabilities because it is difficult to predict 
how changes in the law will affect environmental obstacles and social 
attitudes toward disability.255  Moreover, given the small number of 
parents who want to offer their child an unpopular physical trait, many 
years will pass before there is any clear precedent establishing which 
physical traits are found to violate a child’s right to an open future and 
which ones are fair game.  Parents who know their actions will be judged 
after the fact based on future social conditions will be hesitant to choose 
any trait that could possibly subject them to litigation.  In this way, the 
social harm approach would prevent parents from choosing a wide array 
of physical traits, many of which may not actually be harmful to the 
child. 
                                                 
253 Fox, supra note 23, at 569. 
254 But see Burnette v. Wahl, 588 P.2d 1105, 1111–12 (Or. 1978) (noting that while in other 
situations it may be appropriate to award damages based solely on emotional harm, this 
rationale does not apply to parent-child relationships). 
255 See Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act:  
Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 217 (2008) 
(discussing how the expected social and environmental impacts of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 failed to materialize). 
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The problem of over-deterrence has broad implications.  Some 
scholars have warned that if genetic intervention is legal and readily 
available, we will see physical diversity shrink as parents feel pressured 
to use genetic intervention to give their children the most prestigious 
physical traits.  Some predict a Gattaca-esque world where those who are 
naturally born with traits that are viewed as imperfections become part 
of a lower caste, a minority rejected and demoralized for their inborn 
failings.256  Fox refers to the laissez-faire approach to genetic intervention 
as a “new eugenics”257—because he believes it could lead to further 
marginalization and eradication of members of disfavored groups.258 
If widely available genetic intervention threatens physical and 
cultural diversity, then this threat can only be made worse by a legal 
scheme that punishes parents who seek to give their children unpopular 
physical traits.  Under the social harm approach, parents could freely 
choose to give their child any of the attributes commonly favored in 
society, but they could not consider other physical traits without risking 
liability.  The social harm approach is not truly “eugenic” inasmuch as it 
is not a state-sponsored attempt to cleanse the population of 
characteristics presumed inferior.259  But the social harm approach 
threatens a eugenic consequence:  through civil tort liability, the state 
would implicitly condemn and punish the creation of socially disfavored 
physical attributes while permitting the creation of physical attributes 
that society deems beneficial. 
2. Parents with Disabilities 
A second problem with the social harm approach is that it limits 
parental discretion to conform with dominant social views.  Smolensky 
admits that parents who might use genetic intervention in favor of 
disability would do so with good intentions.260  Nonetheless, she argues 
that there is a danger of parents imprudently selecting attributes that 
will be bad for the child.261 
It must be noted that in Smolensky’s analysis the misguided parents 
who cannot be trusted to choose the best traits for their child are usually 
parents with disabilities.  Arguing that the threat of harm to children is 
                                                 
256 Fox, supra note 23, at 572 (summarizing arguments regarding polarization and 
critiquing them). 
257 Id. at 569. 
258 Id. at 607–12. 
259 See generally Paul A. Lombardo, Disability, Eugenics, and the Culture Wars, 2 ST. LOUIS 
U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 57 (2008). 
260 Smolensky, Genetic Interventions, supra note 9, at 308–09. 
261 Id. at 305, 317. 
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real, Smolensky tells of an “[o]ff-the-record” story about parents of short 
stature strong-arming their physician to implant an embryo that has the 
genotype for achondroplasia: 
According to one account, parents with achondroplasia 
told their physician that if he refused to help them select 
a child with achondroplasia, they would go to another 
IVF clinic, refuse PGD testing, get pregnant, have the 
fetus tested via amniocentesis for achondroplasia, and 
abort any child not carrying the gene. . . . Not wanting to 
be the cause of an unnecessary abortion and recognizing 
that the end result would be the same with or without 
his assistance (a child with achondroplasia), the 
physician agreed to help the parents utilize PGD to 
select for a child with achondroplasia.262 
Those who find the actions of the parents in this story reprehensible 
would probably find the behavior just as bad, or perhaps worse, if the 
parents had been threatening to abort any child that did not test with the 
genotype for blue eyes.  Because this story focuses on disabled parents, it 
might be misread as implying that disabled parents are irrational or 
amoral.263 
Smolensky likely focuses on parents with disabilities because she 
assumes that disabled parents are more likely than others to choose traits 
that are associated with disabilities.264  If this assumption is correct, 
however, then the legal scheme Smolensky proposes would fall harder 
on parents with disabilities than others.265  Parents who are not disabled 
could choose to select a child with their own physical attributes while 
parents with disabilities could not make such a choice without risking 
liability. 
                                                 
262 Id. at 305 (footnotes omitted). 
263 I do not think Smolensky intends this story to suggest such a sweeping and politically 
incorrect statement.  I point out the implied meaning, however, because historically 
Western culture has often punctuated the moral depravity of characters by giving them 
unusual physical traits. 
264 There is a reason for this.  Parents with disabilities might want to have children who 
have socially disfavored traits.  See supra Part III.A (discussing why parents may choose to 
give their child a disability). 
265 See Templeton, supra note 32:  “If choice of embryos for implantation is to be given to 
citizens in general, and if hearing and other people are allowed to choose embryos that will 
be ‘like them’, sharing the same characteristics, language and culture, then we believe that 
deaf people should have the same right.” (quoting Francis Murphy, chairman of the British 
Deaf Association)). 
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Parental autonomy takes on new meaning when the parents are 
themselves disabled.  Historically, courts and legislators have 
underestimated the ability of parents with disabilities to make 
responsible reproductive decisions and care for their children.  Carl H. 
Coleman explains: 
In the early part of the twentieth century, many states 
passed laws requiring the sterilization of certain 
categories of persons, a primary goal of which was to 
prevent people with disabilities from having children.  
The constitutionality of these laws was upheld in Buck v. 
Bell, in which Justice Holmes, upholding the involuntary 
sterilization of an allegedly “feeble minded white 
woman,” famously declared that “three generations of 
imbeciles are enough.”  While Buck v. Bell has been 
criticized extensively, the U.S. Supreme Court has never 
expressly overruled it. 
 
. . . .  
 
 While coercive eugenics laws fell out of favor after 
World War II, the perception that individuals with 
disabilities cannot be good parents has remained 
widespread.  In many states, laws governing the 
termination of parental rights specify a parent’s 
disability as a factor to consider in terminating the 
parent’s rights.  Courts sometimes interpret these 
statutes as creating a presumption that individuals with 
disabilities are unable to parent:  “[D]eaf parents are 
thought to be incapable of effectively stimulating 
language skills; blind parents cannot provide adequate 
attention or discipline; and parents with spinal cord 
injuries cannot adequately supervise their children.”  
These beliefs, as Dave Shade notes, reflect the “all-too-
familiar picture of the parent with a disability:  unable to 
provide care, unable to provide love, unable to be a 
parent.”266 
                                                 
266 Carl H. Coleman, Conceiving Harm:  Disability Discrimination in Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies, 50 UCLA L. REV. 17, 24–26 (2002) (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).  
See also generally Dave Shade, Empowerment for the Pursuit of Happiness:  Parents with 
Disabilities and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 16 LAW & INEQ. 153, 159 (1998); Michael 
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Given the persistence of discrimination against disabled parents, 
Coleman argues, “there is a real danger that disability-related denials of 
ARTs will be based on ignorance or bias against people with 
disabilities.”267 
This unsightly history of discrimination against parents with 
disabilities does not suggest that disabled parents will always make the 
right genetic decisions for their children.  It does, however, give reason 
to suspect that judges and juries will fail to give such parents the full 
deference they deserve.  We should be wary of any approach that 
attempts to second-guess parental decisions, especially when those 
decisions are being made by parents who are inappropriately assumed 
to be inadequate. 
3. Legitimizing Discrimination 
A final problem with the social harm approach, and with the open 
future structure generally, is the message it sends about the 
consequences of disability.  The negative message sent by the open 
future approach to disability has both public and private effects. 
There is some similarity between the implied message of wrongful 
life actions and that of lawsuits based on genetic intervention in favor of 
disability.  Both communicate a similar, disempowering message:  “as a 
matter of law, your impairment, standing alone, is a sufficient basis upon 
which to evaluate the quality of your life.”268  This negative message 
becomes personal, and is more likely to be internalized, when the 
disability becomes the subject of litigation.  Children would be 
compelled to offer testimony of how the traits their parents chose for 
them have made it so they cannot enjoy a complete life.  And jury 
verdicts in the child’s favor would suggest state approval of the view 
that persons with socially disfavored physical traits are destined for a life 
of woe and misery. 
Also problematic, the open future approach promotes unnecessary 
conflict between the interests of the parents and what we assume to be 
the interests of the child.  When this conflict interferes with the parent-
child relationship, it may do more harm than a miscalculation by the 
parents about which physical traits are best for their child.  Discussing 
parents who choose not to terminate pregnancy when they discover they 
are having a child with a genetic anomaly, Shepherd writes: 
                                                                                                             
Ashley Stein, Mommy Has a Blue Wheelchair:  Recognizing the Parental Rights of Individuals 
with Disabilities, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1069, 1083 (1994). 
267 Coleman, supra note 266, at 20. 
268 Hensel, supra note 179, at 174 (discussing the message sent by wrongful birth and 
wrongful life actions). 
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[I]t is not that parents make the best decisions for their 
children, but that it is generally best for children, or 
children-to-be, for parents to make these decisions.  By 
deferring to the parents in this regard, we recognize 
value in the bond that exists between parent and child, a 
bond that first develops, in the usual instance, between 
mother and fetus.269 
Although Shepherd does not address either the right to an open future 
or genetic intervention, she criticizes courts and commentators who 
attempt to balance the child’s right to bodily integrity against the 
mother’s right to bodily integrity.270  Instead of focusing on presumed 
competing rights of the mother and fetus, Shepherd argues, we should 
recognize a common right that benefits mother and fetus, “a right to 
attachment”: 
[T]his conception of the right recognizes that the 
interests of these two “beings” are generally aligned.  It 
arises from the needs of the child, developing now as a 
fetus, because children need to belong, to be a welcomed 
member of their family.  Their need to belong is 
threatened when we evaluate parental decisions made 
concerning their welfare within a rights analysis that 
depends on conflict.271 
This right to attachment recognizes that assessments about quality of life 
are primarily subjective and that failing to respect the parent-fetal 
relationship weakens the ties between parent and child.272 
The problem with the open future framework is not simply that 
some persons with disabilities might be offended by its implied 
messages.  The problem is that in the course of litigation those messages 
create conflicts where they may not already exist and would also fortify 
unproductive stereotypes about the value of persons who have socially 
disfavored physical traits. 
                                                 
269 Shepherd, supra note 19, at 799. 
270 Id. at 793–94, 796–97. 
271 Id. at 798. 
272 Id. at 805 (“The right to attachment protects decisions that most members of society 
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V.  THE MOTHER OF INVENTION273 
Why has so much of the debate over genetic intervention focused on 
whether parents ought to be able to genetically engineer their child to 
have traits associated with disability?  Certainly, it is not because there is 
a large population of parents longing to create children with disabilities. 
There would be little controversy in asking why parents might want 
to give their child blue eyes.  Asking why parents might choose to give 
their child a disability is much more provocative because it draws into 
conflict two perspectives:  on the one hand, the traditional presumption 
that disability is inherently tragic, and on the other hand, the modern call 
for politically correct discussion of disability.274 
When considering genetic intervention in favor of disability, we 
must reach beyond both of these limited perspectives.  Policies in this 
area should not rely, overtly or impliedly, upon the old stereotype that 
disability is inherently tragic.  Nor should policies be set merely to 
satisfy ephemeral notions of political correctness.  The problem with 
asking juries to decide whether a particular physical trait is harmful or 
beneficial is that the question itself implies that physical traits are 
inherently helpful or harmful and that public perceptions of disability 
are legitimate.  The consequences of having physical traits associated 
with disability are not objectively discernable or uniform in nature; they 
derive from protean social attitudes and environments.  Parents, who 
have personal experience with the physical traits in question, are better 
equipped to decide what is best for their offspring than jurors who have 
less experience and less at stake.  Second-guessing parental decisions 
about socially disfavored physical traits only disrupts the parent-child 
relationship and suggests that discriminatory attitudes and practices are 
natural and acceptable. 
Of course, there are other options.  Rather than imposing tort 
liability on parents, we could pass legislation that prohibits the use of 
genetic intervention to choose certain traits or requires physicians to 
                                                 
273 The proverb, “necessity is the mother of invention,” first appears in English print in 
1545:  “Necessitie, the inuentor of all goodnesse (as all authours in a maner, doo 
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274 The dramatic force of this question is used to capture readers’ attention.  Thus, for 
example, Davis opens her book on ethical issues in reproductive technologies with a 
fictional story of Celia, a woman of short stature who wanted a child with similar traits.  
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evaluate the appropriateness of genetic interventions on a case-by-case 
basis.  Both of these approaches carry problems of their own.  Physicians 
are notoriously biased in favor of existing social norms.275  And 
legislatures may not be much better than juries at evaluating the benefits 
and drawbacks of physical traits, especially given that social and 
environmental factors are constantly in flux. 
The debate over genetic intervention has veered down an 
unnecessary path.  Disabled parents who want disabled children are too 
few in number and diverse in purpose to serve as the poster children for 
the debate over genetic intervention.  If, contrary to the evidence, there is 
some threat of parents with disabilities intentionally or recklessly using 
genetic intervention to inflict pain and distress on their child, then we 
already have civil and criminal remedies to address such behavior.  We 
need not expand tort law to meet these remote possibilities.  The 
potential problems with genetic intervention have little to do with 
disability and even less to do with the competence of parents with 
disabilities.  Common fears about physical difference should not be used 
to support asking juries to pass judgment on the cultural and 
philosophical values that guide parental decisions. 
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